

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DOGMATISM AND
UNCONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF OTHERS

A Dissertation
Presented to
the Faculty of the
School of Theology at Claremont

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy

by
Darold Forrest Bigger

May 1978

This dissertation, written by

Darold Forrest Bigger

*under the direction of his Faculty Committee,
and approved by its members, has been presented
to and accepted by the Faculty of the School of
Theology at Claremont in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of*

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Faculty Committee

Allyn S. Mason
Chairman

Paul Schuman

Alan S. Chandler

James C. Turley Jr.

Date April 10, 1978

Joseph A. Haugh

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Special recognition is due several who have been of extraordinary encouragement during the preparation and completion of this project. They will be mentioned in alphabetical order.

Howard Clinebell whose growth model and personal relationship provided the springboard for many of these thoughts.

Frank Kimper who served as committee chairman before his retirement and whose unconditional acceptance will always be treasured.

Allen Moore whose direction of research planning saved many hours later on, and whose willingness to read the manuscript and make final suggestions while on Sabbatical in England insured a consistent orientation.

Dan Rhoades who was willing to join while Allen Moore was away and round out the committee's expertise.

John Robertson, my senior pastor, whose encouragement to take time away from pastoral responsibilities made concentration possible.

Paul Schurman whose positive reinforcement made learning fun and whose willingness to function as committee chairman in Allen Moore's absence allowed graduation on schedule.

Jack Verheyden whose quiet seminar and subsequent direction prompted my interest in Tillich.

And especially to my wife Barbara and daughters Shannon and Hilary who have sacrificed time, energy, and finances in order to see this objective reached.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
LIST OF TABLES	viii
ABSTRACT	ix
Chapter	
1. INTRODUCTION	1
DEFINITIONS OF TERMS	3
RELATED RESEARCH	8
AN OVERVIEW	11
2. DOGMATISM AS DESCRIBED BY MILTON ROKEACH	13
DESCRIPTION OF MILTON ROKEACH'S CONCEPTS	14
Rigidity and Dogmatism Contrasted	15
System Dimensions	17
Belief-Disbelief dimension	17
Central-Peripheral dimension	18
Time-Perspective dimension	19
System summary	19
BELIEF-DISBELIEF SYSTEM	19
Acceptance and Rejection of Others	20
EVALUATION OF MILTON ROKEACH'S CONCEPTS	24
Dogmatism vs. Rigidity	25
Closedness and Authority	25
Summary and Conclusions	31
3. UNCONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF OTHERS AS DESCRIBED BY CARL ROGERS AND PAUL TILlich	33
CARL ROGERS ON UNCONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE	34
The System	36

Chapter	Page
Relationship of the Conditions	37
Unconditional Positive Regard	40
Definition	42
Source	44
Results of unconditional positive regard	46
Evaluation of Rogers' view of unconditional acceptance	49
PAUL TILLICH ON UNCONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE	54
The System	54
Love	57
The qualities of love	61
Love as the absolute principle	64
How love originates and functions	65
The human results of love	69
God's love for humanity	70
Evaluation of Tillich's view of unconditional acceptance	72
COMPARISON OF ROGERS AND TILLICH	75
4. DOGMATISM AND UNCONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF OTHERS	
THEORETICALLY COMPARED	80
THESIS	83
LOVE AS ACCEPTANCE AND JUDGMENT	86
Love as Openness	86
Love as "In Spite Of" Acceptance	90
Love as Condemnation	91
Love as the Absolute	95
Love and Authority	97

Chapter	Page
Love and Human Response	100
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS	102
5. DOGMATISM AND UNCONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF OTHERS	
EMPIRICALLY COMPARED	107
METHODOLOGY	109
Sample	109
Instruments and Procedure	110
ANALYSIS OF THE DATA	111
SUMMARY	115
6. CONCLUSION	117
APPLICATIONS	120
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY	122
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY	124

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. A Coordinated View of Paul Tillich's System	58
2. Denomination of Respondents	111
3. Level of Dogmatism	112
4. Level of Expressed Acceptance of Others	113
5. Linear Regression Analysis for Dogmatism and Expressed Acceptance of Others	115

ABSTRACT

Dogmatism has been assumed to be a defensive rigidity that rejects opposing views, attitudes, and behaviors and those who hold them. Unconditional acceptance is usually described as an open, non-judgmental tolerance. By definition they appear to be opposites.

This study compares the categories on two levels: theoretical and empirical. It makes a distinction between dogma and dogmatism and points out that dogmatism without unconditional acceptance does become legalistic and exclusive while unconditional acceptance without dogma becomes valueless abandonment and meaningless. It is suggested that both might benefit from the other: dogma providing the convictions to keep unconditional acceptance from being chaotic surrender and unconditional acceptance providing the openness to keep dogma from becoming rejecting.

Milton Rokeach's view of dogmatism as a closed way of thinking not tied to any particular ideology is affirmed as well as his belief that it includes an authoritarian outlook. Carl Rogers' description of unconditional positive regard is discussed as a positive recognition of the value and uniqueness of each person. Both, however, see dogmatism and unconditional acceptance as opposites reiterating the dilemma faced in other studies: either dogmatism takes over unconditional acceptance and becomes legalistic and totalitarian or unconditional acceptance destroys dogmatism and becomes meaningless surrender.

Paul Tillich's discussion of love is seen as a potential solution to the dilemma. In that category he includes both open acceptance and condemnation. Assuming that condemnation is based on firm convictions, dogma and acceptance are theoretically included as part of the

same phenomenon. Love as acceptance is given in spite of differences and love as condemnation is not an expression of rejection but of the desire to overcome that which is inhibiting more fulfilling relationships.

It is suggested that if acceptance were to be given on the basis of essential goodness and dogma were to evaluate the distorted expressions of that goodness neither would have to take over the other. Though they would be related as part of the same category--love--they could theoretically operate independently of each other.

Empirically the two are tested as attitudes among Ph.D. level pastoral counseling students. Scores from Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale Form E and Berger's Expressed Acceptance of Others scale are compared by means of correlation analysis. They are significantly related (c. -0.55) indicating that as the level of dogmatism increases the level of acceptance of others decreases.

Possible reasons for the difference between the two categories on the theoretical and functional level are explored. It is suggested that a complimentary relationship between them may be ideal but it is not very realistic. It is too easy for the "in spite of" aspect of love to engender feelings of inequality and destroy real acceptance. It is too difficult to distinguish between essence and expressions of essence when one is hurt, offended, sad, or angry. It is too easy to elevate one's own ideas and convictions to make them (or attempt to make them) applicable to everyone. And it comes too naturally to give in to the demands or expectations of those who are of importance in a misguided attempt to gain the security of acceptance or avoid the anguish of rejection.

Thus, Rokeach's and Rogers' view seems to more correctly describe the way in which the two relate on an affective level in human experience while Tillich's view more adequately depicts the way they relate cognitively and might ideally relate functionally.

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Contemporary descriptions of dogmatism and unconditional acceptance make them appear to be opposites by definition. Dogmatism is seen as a rigid, exclusive, prejudiced stance that excludes conflicting beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors as well as the persons espousing them. It brings to mind impatience, arrogance, bigotry, conservatism, and insensitivity. Unconditional acceptance, on the other hand, is usually viewed as an open, non-judgmental acknowledgment of the value, uniqueness and freedom of each individual. It suggests warmth, support, encouragement, and peacefulness. It is thought to spur creativity, freedom of self-expression, a spirit of community and cooperation.

The relationship between the two is important for the psychologist and counselor for it affects the theoretical foundation of research, study, or practice. Is it necessary to be open toward unlimited new options in order to keep from being locked in to existing knowledge? Must counselees be accepted as they are or is there some place in a therapeutic relationship for the introduction of the counselor's personal values? Does one's own value system adversely affect relationships with others?

For the Christian counselor--and lay person too--it is particularly important. Imbedded in the Christian message is a tension between the two calling on the one hand for acceptance in spite of difference and on the other for a certain amount of conformity to the Christian system. For example, Christianity has traditionally claimed to be the

unique path toward human salvation. New Testament expressions of the universal and singular merit of the Christ event have been repeated by Christian theologians, proclaimed by Christian preachers, and trusted by Christian believers. Yet Christians have also taught that God unconditionally reaches out to all human beings in loving acceptance.

Are those two attitudes compatible in human relationships? Is it possible to maintain claims of a truth being universally ultimate without rejecting those who disagree with or disregard that truth? Is it possible to be unconditionally accepting of another while holding exclusive claims that differ from the values, attitudes, or behavior of that other? Are there ways in which ideas can be held dogmatically without affecting one's attitude toward others? As one becomes more rigid in a dogmatic stance, does one become less accepting of others?

This study is an exploratory one that will investigate the relationship between dogmatism and unconditional acceptance of others. It will do that on two levels, the theoretical and affective. It will investigate how the two might be related cognitively as ideas and then how they seem to relate functionally as attitudes.

It will not devote itself to describing how either dogmatism or unconditional acceptance of others or both affect those in whom they are found. It will not be an effort to determine how either or both affect the counselor, counseling skills, or the success of the counseling process. It will not deal with the relationship of self to other acceptance, will not demographically describe those who are dogmatic or other accepting, or outline what kind of therapy or approach to therapy these characteristics suggest. Nor will it describe the behaviors that are implied or involved.

It will be done in the fields of theology and psychology. Combining those two disciplines presupposes several things that need to be spelled out. First it assumes that a constructive relationship exists between the two. Second it assumes that by complimenting and confronting each other both can be stronger and can more adequately describe the human condition and prescribe the most promising channels for its improvement. Third it assumes that the goals of each, if not the same, are at least similar, and that both disciplines contribute to the achievement of those objectives.

This optimistic view of the way in which theology and psychology can inform each other does not erase a major hazard. While they may share similarities there are also some differences that must be kept in mind. While psychologists are primarily concerned with studying and describing human behavior, theologians tend to be somewhat more metaphysically oriented. To compare the two without giving notice to this potential distinction may lead to the false assumption that psychologists are describing what they feel ought to be, which is usually not the case, and that theologians are describing what is, which is often not the case. A delineation must be made between descriptions of what a theorist believes might be and what he or she believes is extant in human experience.

DEFINITIONS OF TERMS

The words "dogmatism" and "dogma" and "dogmatic" come from the Greek word $\delta\omicron\kappa\epsilon\omega$ which means to think, believe, suppose, consider. It carries the connotation of subjectivity and opinion. The Greek noun $\delta\acute{o}\xi\alpha$ (doxa) was used as early as Homer and Herodotus and contained

the meaning of what one personally thought or what was thought about another person, i.e. personal opinion or reputation.¹ This is the pre-dominant understanding of these words today. In the history of Judeo-Christian thought, however, a new dimension was added. In the LXX (the Septuagint, the pre-Christian translation of the Hebrew Old Testament into Greek) and New Testament the verb form does not change in meaning from regular Greek usage. But the noun takes on religious meaning. In the LXX it is only seldom used as opinion² while in the New Testament it is never used in that sense. While still being used as reputation and honor, it comes to mean radiance, brilliance, majesty, power, and the being of God.³

Kittel suggests that this was the result of applying this noun to translate the Hebrew word family **כבוד** (kabod) which described God in those terms. He explains:

When the translator of the OT first thought of using **δόξα** for **כבוד**, he initiated a linguistic change of far-reaching significance, giving to the Greek term a distinctiveness of sense which could hardly be surpassed. Taking a word for opinion, and conjectures, he made it express something absolutely objective, i.e. the reality of God.⁴

In the New Testament the term is applied to Jesus thus attributing Divine descriptions to human form.⁵ It also was used to mean light, radiance, brilliance, and these two types of usage, when combined, brought an interesting conclusion. The **δόξα** of Christ becomes the possession and expectation of **δόξα** for the disciples of Christ through the Spirit.⁶ In this way Christians came to see themselves participating

¹Gerhard Kittel, "δοκέω" in Gerhard Kittel (ed.), Theological Dictionary of the New Testament (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964), II, 233.

²Ibid., p. 243.

³Ibid., p. 237.

⁴Ibid., p. 245.

⁵Ibid., p. 251.

⁶Ibid., p. 251.

in the absolute objective reality of God rather than the subjective opinions of human beings.

James Montague Cook explains that for the Christian Church it suggested truth, security, ultimacy, certainty. It was a revelation of great importance from the one they considered the ultimate authority.⁷

Those convictions about dogma have led to excesses such as intolerance, persecution, denial of human rights, rejection, and destruction that are well known. The claims of certainty have led from dogma to dogmatism which Cook describes as imperialistic or totalitarian.⁸ Dogmatism, and the other terms related to it, have come to have pejorative meaning because of these kinds of excesses. Etienne Gilson's definition of dogmatism serves as an example of one description that portrays that view:

(Dogmatism is) The philosophical attitude of those who maintain that some propositions are not merely probable or practically certain, but unconditionally true, provided only we agree on the meaning of their terms and are able to understand them.⁹

Cook points out that the danger in dogmatism is not its underlying search for certainty but its potential for becoming intolerant, totalitarian, and imperialistic. Dogmatism itself, despite this potential, "reflects man's search for certainty, for assurance in matters conceived to be of ultimate significance."¹⁰ The desire for assurance and firm conviction may describe an important human need.

⁷James Montague Cook, Grace and Dogmatism in the Theology of Nels F. S. Ferré (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1975), p. 23.

⁸Ibid., p. 31.

⁹Etienne Gilson, Dogmatism and Tolerance (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1952), p. 2.

¹⁰Cook, p. 31.

Because of that possibility and because of the negatively charged associations with the word "dogmatism," these firm convictions and the attitude of confidence will be called "dogma" throughout this study. "Dogmatism" will be considered a synonym of closedmindedness, defensiveness, intolerance, and refer to the judgmental excesses with which it is currently associated.

"Unconditional acceptance" will be used in the standard sense of openmindedness, prizing, tolerance, and those terms will be considered as synonymous with each other and describing a non-judgmental, non-evaluative acceptance. It is true that this description opens up the notion of acceptance to criticism as well as support. With no value judgments at all it could become an impersonal, unfeeling openness that is so uninvolved as to become meaningless. But it does reflect the theoretical descriptions of leading scholars and contains the potential of a supportive, creative environment.

This implies that there may be positive and negative consequences from both dogma-dogmatism and unconditional acceptance. As Melvin Foulds suggests, perhaps there is a difference between "benevolent" and "non-benevolent" dogmatism.¹¹ And unconditional acceptance may have negative connotations as well as positive, as is pointed out by Ronald Vande Loo.¹²

¹¹Melvin L. Foulds, "Dogmatism and the Ability to Communicate Facilitative Conditions During Counseling," Counselor Education and Supervision, XI:2 (December 1971), 110-114.

¹²Ronald John Vande Loo, "A Social Character Analysis of Individuals Scoring Open-minded on the Dogmatism Scale," Dissertation Abstracts International, XXXV:12 (June 1975), 6120B-6121B.

The direction in which the study moves can now be indicated. The hope is that some way might be found to hold onto the positive offerings of dogma and unconditional acceptance without either being destroyed by the negative side of the other. There is little question but that, on the theoretical level, dogmatism as rejection would be inimical with unconditional acceptance as non-evaluative openness. But it will be suggested that picturing dogma as rejecting dogmatism and unconditional acceptance as non-evaluative openness does not do justice to either category individually or to their relationship. The theoretical thesis of this study will be that dogma-dogmatism need not always be rejecting though it may be confronting, and unconditional acceptance need not always be tolerant in the sense of being valueless, indifferent, or apathetic in order to be unconditional. Dogma may provide the conviction to keep acceptance from being impersonal and meaningless. Unconditional acceptance may provide the openness to prevent dogma from becoming dogmatism and rejecting others.

The Church has so feared permissiveness that they have often encouraged a dogmatic legalism to prevent it. Reacting to that rigidity, others have sometimes seemed to encourage a non-evaluative openness to counteract the legalism. Perhaps both have gone to unnecessary extremes in order to set themselves clearly apart from each other. Exploring the possibility of holding the two together becomes the task of the theoretical part of this study.

Secondly, their relationship will be investigated on the affective level. It is possible that the two categories will relate quite differently at this level, especially if predictions are made on the basis of what might ideally be possible rather than what is most likely to occur.

RELATED RESEARCH

When Milton Rokeach began investigating the concept of dogmatism in the late 50s, his studies found a ready audience. His book, The Open and Closed Mind, became the standard statement on the subject. In it he describes the characteristics of a dogmatic person, one of which is a negative view of self and others.

There are several studies that have substantiated that link. Barbara Long studied the differences in acceptance of others and compared that with scores from the Dogmatism Scale. Her study was done among Catholics and Protestants and while she found no significant correlation between religious affiliation and dogmatism level the dogmatism level did have an effect on acceptance of others.¹³ Daniel Finnigan's dissertation substantiated Rokeach's theory that dogmatism and self-regard are related.¹⁴ And Eulogy Gonzalez-Tamayo, while comparing Spanish and American Catholic high school students, verified that dogmatism and acceptance of others were significantly related in both boys and girls from both Spain and the United States.¹⁵

However, those studies showing an evidence of a relationship between the two categories present only part of the picture. Other

¹³Barbara H. Long, "Catholic-Protestant Differences in Acceptance of Others," Sociology and Social Science Research, XLIX:2 (1965), 166-172.

¹⁴Daniel William Finnigan, "Relationship of Openmindedness/Closemindedness to Certain Personality Characteristics Involving Self-Regard," Dissertation Abstracts International, XXXII:4 (October 1971), 2376B.

¹⁵Eulogy Gonzalez-Tamayo, "Dogmatism, Self-Acceptance and Acceptance of Others Among Spanish and American Students," Journal of Social Psychology, XCIV (1971), 25.

tests have brought the subject into question. W. R. Passons studied various characteristics of the counselor, including dogmatism, and tested their relationship to the counselor's empathic sensitivity. He determined that dogmatism and empathic sensitivity may not be related.¹⁶ Rose Sherr studied nursing and occupational therapy students to see if high dogmatic students would be more accepting of clients whose behavior was congruent with the student's beliefs and less accepting of those whose behavior was different from the student's beliefs. Her hypothesis was disproved.¹⁷ Melvin Foulds tested 30 graduate students on the relationship between their level of dogmatism and their ability to communicate empathy, positive regard and genuineness. He found them not related.¹⁸ Dorothy Lee's dissertation investigated how beliefs about self and others were affected by the level of dogmatism. Though the two were related the correlation was small and she questions the validity of asserting that dogmatism includes a negative view of others.¹⁹ Mary Digenan's study of the relationship between dogmatism and tolerance/intolerance among various types of religious groups indicated that only in one group were the two related.²⁰ Doris Collins' dissertation study

¹⁶W. R. Passons, "The Relationship of Counselor Characteristics and Empathic Sensitivity," Dissertation Abstracts, XXIX (1968), 2968A.

¹⁷Rose Lynn Sherr, "Dogmatism as a Factor in Preprofessionals' Evaluations of Persons with Physical Disabilities," Dissertation Abstracts International, XXXI:11 (May 1971), 6164A.

¹⁸Foulds, 1971.

¹⁹Dorothy Eleanor Lee, "Beliefs About Self and Others: A Test of the Dogmatism Theory," Dissertation Abstracts International, XXXI:9 (March 1971), 4887A.

²⁰Sister Mary Anne Digenan, "The Relationship of Religious Orientation, Prejudice, and Dogmatism in Three Groups of Christian College Students," Dissertation Abstracts International, XXXIII:6 (December 1972), 2789B-2790B.

group was composed of nursing students who were tested to see if high dogmatic students had less empathic ability than low dogmatic students. They did not.²¹

The particular setting of this study was most closely approached by David Williams and Bruce Kremer. They compared pastoral counseling students with secular counseling students as to their degree of religious belief, their dogmatism level, and their acceptance of others (counselees specifically). While confirming suspicions that the pastoral counseling students would be more dogmatic they also discovered that they were more accepting than the secular counseling students. They concluded that pastoral counselors can create a facilitative environment for the counselee's growth because their values include acceptance, their appreciation of religious dimensions may foster more support for individual freedom and potential, and low dogmatism levels may not be essential for a productive counseling relationship.²²

Most of these studies have been empirical. What seems necessary at this juncture is a continued investigation of the relationship of these two categories, both theoretically and functionally. Ronald Vande Loo made significant progress in that direction when he devoted his dissertation to describing those who scored openminded on the Dogmatism Scale. One conclusion he reached is that unconditional acceptance cannot mean disinterested love, i.e. non-caring, laissez faire, but must mean love in spite of differences. Without dogmatism, he says,

²¹Doris Louise Collins, "Empathic Ability and Dogmatism in Nursing Students," Dissertation Abstracts International, XXXIII:6 (December 1972), 2609A.

²²David L. Williams and Bruce J. Kremer, "Pastoral Counseling Students and Secular Counseling Students: A Comparison," Journal of Counseling Psychology, XXI:3 (May 1974), 238-242.

unconditional acceptance is really detachment and demonstrates non-caring. And he suggests that those who are more openminded may not be more healthy as has been assumed but may simply be more adapted to changing social conditions.²³

James Cook has done for a description of dogmatism what Vande Loo did for unconditional acceptance. He asserts that if there were no doubt about the truth there would be no need for dogma for truth would be apparent to everyone. But because truth is not clear, dogma is an attempt to clarify the revelation of the ultimate so everyone can know it.²⁴ He demonstrates the importance of dogmatism as it indicates that no one thing is ultimate, a correct knowledge of the ultimate is not readily available to all, and there is the possibility of human response.²⁵

AN OVERVIEW

This study is both a theoretical and empirical discussion of the relationship between dogmatism and unconditional acceptance of others. The first several chapters work through the theoretical question and set up the hypothesis which is tested empirically.

Chapter 2 looks at Milton Rokeach's development of the concept of dogmatism as a system of belief/disbelief rather than rigidity on any

²³Vande Loo, p. 6128B.

²⁴Cook, p. 43.

²⁵Ibid., p. 48. He does, however, conclude that the only way to overcome the negative potential of dogmatism is to have the radical unconditional nature of grace overcome it and acknowledges the resultant "universal salvation." P. 268.

specific issues. That description is placed in the context of his overall view of personality structure then critically evaluated.

Chapter 3 presents the concept of unconditional acceptance as developed by Carl Rogers and Paul Tillich. Rogers' emphasis on unconditional positive regard as open acceptance is described, placed in the context of his view of effective counseling and human growth, and evaluated. Tillich's description of love as the absolute principle is explored as to its relevance to this subject, and evaluated. The chapter closes with a comparison of the Rogerian and Tillichian understandings of this notion.

Chapter 4 brings together the views of Rokeach, Rogers, and Tillich and looks briefly at how they might compliment and inform each other. Then the theoretical thesis of this study is stated and the ramifications it has on the concepts of dogmatism and unconditional acceptance of others are explored.

Chapter 5 compares the two as attitudes. Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale Form E and Berger's Expressed Acceptance of Self and Expressed Acceptance of Others scale were used to provide the data. The dogmatism scores were compared with the acceptance of others scores by correlation analysis and the results reported.

Chapter 6 summarizes the study in its entirety and suggests implications for future investigation.

Chapter 2

DOGMATISM AS DESCRIBED BY MILTON ROKEACH

In 1947 Milton Rokeach finished a Ph.D. dissertation on a subject that prompted several years of continued investigation on his part. At that time he referred to it as rigidity but his study included the investigation and analyzation of authoritarianism, dogmatism, and other related concepts. He later came to expand on the existing definitions of dogmatism and in his own view saw it as including (1) a closed way of thinking, (2) an authoritarian outlook, and (3) a rejection of those with dissimilar beliefs and acceptance of those with similar beliefs.

At the outset it is evident that he is primarily describing dogmatism according to the way it functions. He does come to describe his understanding of what its origins are in the individual and society. But his central interest and thus most likely benefit to this study is his understanding of how dogmatism operates in human relationships.

"Dogmatism" has been historically associated with a variety of cultures and ideas. Depending on one's point of view, it conjures up images of strength, resoluteness and consistency or static rigidity, bigoted isolation, and often outright hostility.

According to some, dogmatism is an enviable trait that preserves the values of an individual or social group, provides the stability that welds one individual to another and one generation to another. It gives security to the present by preserving the past.

According to others, this stated advantage is in fact a hazard. Dogmatism, they point out, limits the growth and progress of individuals and society precisely because it's energy is directed toward preserving

the past. Without a willingness to let go of memory there can be no exploration of new ideas. Dogmatism inhibits creativity and without that the challenges of this and future decades cannot be met.

In spite of these opposing views of the value of dogmatism, there is one part of its function on which all would agree: dogmatism is associated with authority. Biblically, for example, the word "dogma" was used to describe pronouncements of authority figures. The Septuagint uses it for kings' decrees. The New Testament decree of Ceasar Augustus at the time of Christ's birth that required all families to return to their ancestral home for a census and taxation was a "dogma." Decisions of the apostles were referred to by that term also so that by the time of Clement of Alexandria the entire Christian revelation was "dogma."¹ At that time to be dogmatic meant to be part of the authoritative revelation from God. Only by extension did it come to refer to those who were unwilling to deviate from that "dogma" and hence to the way in which we usually associate dogmatism today with rigidly holding to any idea, value, or attitude.

DESCRIPTION OF MILTON ROKEACH'S CONCEPTS

Milton Rokeach's extensive research into dogmatism has helped clarify the issue. His Ph.D. dissertation at the University of California was titled "Generalized Mental Rigidity as a Factor in Ethnocentrism." Two significant discoveries prompted further study. One was that those who were more ethnocentric than the median were more rigid in

¹James Montague Cook, Grace and Dogmatism in the Theology of Nels F. S. Ferré (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1975), p. 29.

solving all types of problems, not just social ones.² This led to his later emphasis on belief-disbelief systems rather than a description of dogmatic behavior like Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levison and Sanford did in their 1950 book, The Authoritarian Personality.³

Secondly, he discovered that there was rigidity at both ethnocentric extremes, i.e., among those who were pro-minority as well as among those who were anti-minority.⁴ This fact led him to develop his own instruments to rate the level of dogmatism and to make a distinction between rigidity and dogmatism. Let's look first at this last thought.

Rigidity and Dogmatism Contrasted

One of Rokeach's major differences with Adorno, et. al., is that he objects to their specific descriptions of authoritarianism. Seeing that there was rigidity among both extremes in his dissertation study brought into question the accuracy of describing authoritarians as anti-minority conservatives. The F scale used by Adorno, et. al., is accurate in that it determines potential fascists, but it doesn't determine authoritarians in general, said Rokeach. He wanted a broader description than was then in use.

Therefore, he made a distinction between rigidity and dogmatism. Rigidity, he said, refers to specific acts while dogmatism refers to the

²Milton Rokeach, "Generalized Mental Rigidity as a Factor in Ethnocentrism," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, XLIII (July 1948), 277.

³T. Adorno, E. Frenkel-Brunswick, D. Levison, and R. N. Sanford, The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper & Row, 1950).

⁴Milton Rokeach, "Narrow-mindedness and Personality," Journal of Personality, XX (1951), 246-247.

systems by which a person believes or disbelieves.⁵ A person who resists change on a single issue is rigid while one who resists changing a belief system is dogmatic. For example, a Roman Catholic who refuses to have an abortion (unwilling to change her view on that issue) yet is willing to entertain the possibility of birth control (and thus change her belief about birth control and her belief system about Roman Catholic authority over her in this area) would be rigid but not dogmatic according to this definition.

Because the F scale measured rigidity only on specific issues and no one else had developed what he needed, it was necessary for Rokeach to design his own instrument in order to continue his research. He worked on both a Dogmatism and an Opinionation Scale. The Opinionation Scale's questions requested reactions largely to current events and thus has not been widely used. The Dogmatism Scale, however, has been repeatedly validated, revised, and shortened, and is often the standard measure in research for this trait.

In comparing the Dogmatism Scale with the California F scale, it was discovered that the Dogmatism Scale found that trait among both right and left wings while the California F scale measured only the right. Thus one of Rokeach's major concerns--that dogmatism is a belief-disbelief system to be found among both right and left wing groups rather than rigidity as a right wing phenomenon--had been satisfactorily addressed.⁶

⁵Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind (New York: Basic, 1960), p. 195.

⁶Milton Rokeach, "Political and Religious Dogmatism: An Alternative to the Authoritarian Personality," Psychological Monographs, LXX (1956), 1-43.

System Dimensions

Next he turned his attention to developing a description of what he called a belief-disbelief system. He said:

Long before we were able to define the phenomenon of ideological dogmatism explicitly, it seemed clear that it referred to a number of things: a closed way of thinking which could be associated with any ideology regardless of content, an authoritarian outlook on life, an intolerance toward those with opposing beliefs, and a suffering of those with similar beliefs.⁷

It was his aim to describe the way in which individuals go about accepting or rejecting ideas or people. He believed (and still does) that there are structural properties that tie together a person's ideological, conceptual, perceptual, and esthetic systems so that the way those systems are approached is predictably similar.⁸

There are three basic parts to Rokeach's system: the Belief-Disbelief dimension, the Central-Peripheral dimension, and the Time-Perspective dimension. Each is involved in the final level of dogmatism, but each has its own unique function. The suggestion is that if one understands the function, content and relationship of the three dimensions, accurate predictions can be made as to whether new persons and ideas will be accepted or rejected.

Belief-Disbelief dimension. The Belief-Disbelief dimension determines the way beliefs are organized and maintained.⁹ Rokeach leads

⁷Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind, p. 5.

⁸Ibid., pp. 7-8.

⁹Robert Straight Treat, "A Validation Study of Rokeach's Theory of Dogmatism" (unpublished MA thesis, Claremont Graduate School, 1963), p. 10.

to some confusion by talking about two "systems" here, a belief system and a disbelief system. This use of the word is not to be confused with the sum of all three dimensions which he calls the "Belief-Disbelief System." Nor is that Belief-Disbelief System which includes all three dimensions to be confused with this dimension which he also calls Belief-Disbelief!

To say it another way, his whole approach to explaining dogmatism is to see it as a Belief-Disbelief System. That basic system is divided into three dimensions one of which is the Belief-Disbelief dimension. That dimension is divided into two major parts, the Belief system and the Disbelief system.

This dimension has three properties in which it varies from one person to another: (1) the degree of isolation within and between systems or how well individuals correlate beliefs and disbeliefs, (2) the degree of differentiation between systems and within the disbelief system or how well individuals distinguish between beliefs and disbeliefs, and how well they distinguish one disbelief from another, and (3) the comprehensiveness or narrowness of the system or how broad a spectrum of subject areas are included in the system.¹⁰

Central-Peripheral dimension. The Central-Peripheral dimension determines our attitudes toward self, society, and authority.¹¹ The dimension is divided into three regions. The central region contains primitive beliefs which Rokeach described as those which are assumed

¹⁰Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind, pp. 35-39.

¹¹Treat, p. 10.

because "everyone" confirms them or no one can dispute them.¹² The specific content of primitive beliefs is that the world is friendly or unfriendly.¹³

In the intermediate region our basic relationship to authority is found. It is here that we accept or reject authority and persons.¹⁴ This is the focal point of this study since we're investigating the relationship of dogmatism and the acceptance of others. We'll look into this further in the next section of this chapter.

The peripheral region contains the specific beliefs gathered from the central or intermediate regions. Those specific beliefs will vary in the degree to which they are related to one another, and that is an indication of the level of dogmatism.¹⁵

Time-Perspective dimension. The Time-Perspective dimension refers to the individual's relationship to past, present, and future and how these three are integrated with each other.¹⁶

System summary. The system Rokeach has put together would look like this in chart form.

BELIEF-DISBELIEF SYSTEM

Belief-Disbelief dimension	Central-Peripheral dimension	Time-Perspective dimension
belief system	central region	past
disbelief system	intermediate region	present
	peripheral region	future

¹²Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind, pp. 41-42.

¹³Ibid., p. 56.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 42.

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 39-50.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 51-53.

Acceptance and Rejection of Others

Let's look more closely at how Rokeach said the individual's belief-disbelief system can determine whether others are accepted or rejected.

It has already been mentioned that this acceptance or rejection will take place in the intermediate region of the Central-Peripheral dimension. As one's attention expands beyond primitive beliefs, and moves toward authority beliefs, derived beliefs, and inconsequential beliefs, the necessity of making decisions about others is faced.

Primitive beliefs are preideological, deal primarily with the self, and are formed in direct contact with the object of belief.¹⁷ Authority beliefs, on the other hand, begin to face one with other beings. The formation of beliefs, attitudes, and values here is not made by evaluating one's personal response to life or self. While authority beliefs are still ideological, they represent a cognitive synthesis based on one's already existing primitive beliefs that have 100 percent consensus.¹⁸

Stated in another way, beliefs about authority are built on our primitive beliefs, specifically that type of primitive belief for which there is total agreement. Here we decide whether or not authority figures can be trusted. Here we determine which will become normative and which will not, whose statements we'll accept as truth and whose we'll not. This is an important point to which we shall soon return.

¹⁷Milton Rokeach, Beliefs, Attitudes and Values (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1968), pp. 6-8.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 91.

From these authorities come our derived beliefs, the fourth of Rokeach's five types of beliefs. (The five are: Type A = primitive beliefs for which there is 100 percent consensus, Type B = primitive beliefs with no consensus, Type C = authority beliefs, Type D = derived beliefs, and Type E = inconsequential beliefs. All have been described but the last. Inconsequential beliefs are just that, incidental beliefs which, even though they may be incontrovertable because of their origin in a primitive belief, are not integrated with the other types.¹⁹) It is these derived beliefs that we face as the conscious data on which our decisions are made. They are the facts taught in school, the attitudes we develop toward others, the values that orient our lives. It's on this level that new facts or persons are consciously accepted or rejected.

The relationship of these various parts could be illustrated on a plane like this:


Central region	Intermediate region	Peripheral region
<hr/>		
primitive beliefs	authority and derived beliefs	inconsequential beliefs
Type A	Type C	Type D
Type B		Type E

The different types of belief are on a continuum between the poles of the Central and Peripheral regions.

There is part of Rokeach's concern that is not adequately portrayed in this way, however, and that is the unconscious--or what he calls pre-ideological and primitive--aspects to the central region. For him the matter of centrality is vital since he believes that the impor-

¹⁹Ibid., p. 11.

tance of beliefs varies along the Central-Peripheral dimension.²⁰ On the plane above, those beliefs toward the left of the graph would be more important and thus more difficult to alter. While a lineal model does best represent his dimensional concept, a circular one best describes this centrality.



Now the potential consequences of belief change or the introduction of new beliefs becomes very clear. The closer a belief is to the center, the more difficult it is to change, and the more repercussions a change will make on the rest of the system.²¹

What affect does this have on the acceptance or rejection of others? The most apparent is that those who would most easily fit into the individual's belief-disbelief system would be most likely to be accepted while those most unlike the system would be most likely to be rejected. That is to say that those whose primitive and authority

²⁰Ibid., p. 3.

²¹Ibid., p. 3. He does qualify that by saying all five types of belief can be held in equal intensity, but the intensity is usually positively associated with centrality. P. 13.

beliefs have led to similar derived beliefs would not be upsetting to the other's belief-disbelief system and thus they would be compatible.

Both Rokeach's theory and his research agree with this assumption. In fact, he says that similarity is the most powerful determinant for accepting or rejecting others.²²

A most interesting project among whites and blacks in both the North and South and two groups of Jewish students, narrowed down the type of similarity that was most important. Contrary to anticipated results, the acceptance or rejection of friends was not so much based on ethnic similarity as it was similarity of beliefs.²³ Studies also showed that those changing churches most frequently changed to ones most similar to their previous one,²⁴ that the frequency of interfaith marriages varied directly with interfaith similarity, and that within those marriages the less similar the denominations the more frequent were marital conflicts.²⁵

Why is similarity of belief so important? Perhaps because to accept opposing beliefs is to require a change in one's own or introduce conflict. That brings the insecurity of newness, the unknown. So one reason dissimilar persons are rejected is that the need to know sets up a system closed to new or different views.²⁶

Another reason dissimilarity prompts rejection is that it is seen as a threat. Anxiety is raised and controlled by a corresponding mobilization of defenses. In the extreme, Rokeach said, the closed

²²Ibid., p. 63.

²³Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind, p. 166.

²⁴Ibid., p. 317.

²⁵Ibid., pp. 325-326.

²⁶Ibid., p. 67.

system is the total psychoanalytic defense mechanisms working in concert.²⁷

Similarity is one source of acceptance, the most important one. But a second cannot be neglected. It is the openness of the system. In his experiments, Rokeach found that over the whole continuum, similarity-dissimilarity of belief was the most significant factor in acceptance-rejection. But it didn't explain the strong rejection of some groups that were most like each other.²⁸ (He uses the traditional rivalry between Catholics and Episcopalians, Americans and British as examples.)

There are some basic differences between those who are closed (dogmatic) and those who are open (nondogmatic). Closed persons are able to analyze single beliefs easily,²⁹ but don't integrate new beliefs into the system as fast or remember new things as well as open persons.³⁰ And the more open a system is the less concern the individual has for evaluations or expectations of authority figures and other similar external information. The new information is processed on its own merits.³¹

EVALUATION OF MILTON ROKEACH'S CONCEPTS

Rokeach values openmindedness above closedmindedness. He has a basic trust in humanity to respond creatively to each situation in a spontaneous and acceptable way. He believes the openminded person is more likely to distinguish between information about the world (that is necessary in responding to the world) and information about the source

²⁷Ibid., p. 70

²⁸Ibid., pp. 300ff.

²⁹Ibid., p. 286.

³⁰Ibid., p. 213.

³¹Ibid., p. 58.

(that is extraneous in responding to the world). Whereas the closed-minded person may not make that distinction.

If this sounds much like Gestalt language there is good reason. He says Gestalt is the most appropriate therapeutic approach with open systems while behaviorism and classical psychoanalysis fit most easily with closed systems.³² Open systems would be more humanistically oriented and require an active, creative approach to life.

Dogmatism vs. Rigidity

One of his early contributions was separating dogmatism from rigidity. This was a major positive step in the development of this subject and opened a new arena to investigation. It was this discovery that prompted him to define a belief system rather than dogmatic beliefs. The isolation of the system from individual specific descriptions of dogmatism led to his investigation of the relationship between beliefs, attitudes, and values, and finally to his present concentration on values and value systems.

Closedness and Authority

Even though his study took a different tack than that of Adorno, et. al., he too got caught up in the relationship of authoritarianism and dogmatism. For example, the place of authority is the dominant concern of the intermediate region of the central-peripheral dimension. In a closed system persons are accepted or rejected on the basis of their adherence to similar authorities (which produces similar derived beliefs).

³²Ibid., pp. 64-65.

Derived beliefs are related because they have a common origin in authority, not because of their intrinsic connections. This dependence on authority figures, outdated and irrelevant though they be, becomes the major reason for his rejecting the closed system.

In our culture, dogmatism has primarily negative connotations. Sheikh and Moleski discovered that the students they tested saw themselves as less dogmatic than neurotics or even normal persons.³³ Subject response intimated that a high level of dogmatism was considered unhealthy.

Researchers themselves don't escape that anti-dogmatism bias as indicated by Greene's study in which he classified high dogmatism as "less healthy" and low dogmatism as "more healthy." He even used Rokeach's dogmatism scale to define "neuroticism and self-alienation."³⁴

Rokeach helps identify part of the source for that negative view of dogmatism when he links it with neurotic defense mechanisms. We associate it with the defenses used to hide from self and the world. In that case, if dogmatism is in fact defensiveness, there would be strong reason to classify it as the opposite of unconditional acceptance. Defensive isolation would preclude the possibility of accepting any but one's own kind because of its closed, belligerent stance toward the external world of persons and ideas.

³³Agnees S. Sheikh and L. Martin Moleski, "Dogmatism and Mental Health: A Study in Perceived Relationship," Perceptual and Motor Skills, XLI (August 1975), 290.

³⁴Ronald Greene, "Self-Disclosure, Dogmatism, and Sensory Acuity as They Relate to Humanistic Concepts of Mental Health," Dissertation Abstracts International, XXXII (May 1972), 6647B.

Vande Loo resists the idea that openminded persons are more healthy than closedminded persons. His research suggests that they may be more adapted to changing social conditions yet more detached and alienated than the closedminded.³⁵

It seems to me that there are two parts of Rokeach's own work that mitigate against the total rejection of closedmindedness. First, we've seen that of the two reasons for accepting or rejecting others--similarity/dissimilarity and open/closedness--similarity is by far the most important. Both open and closed persons reject others who are dissimilar from them. Thus rejection, while associated with dogmatism, is also present among non-dogmatic persons.

That leads to his own and very important distinction between differing types of rejection and acceptance. He points out that one can reject an idea then categorically reject any persons who espouse that idea. And, by the same token, one can accept an idea and look favorably on any others who do the same. He calls this "opinionated rejection" and "opinionated acceptance."³⁶ What Rokeach is describing as opinionated rejection and acceptance is a two phase process: first the ideas of the other are evaluated and accepted or rejected, second the other person is evaluated on the basis of those ideas and accepted or rejected accordingly.

If there were some way of separating the two stages of that process so that the other is not accepted or rejected because their

³⁵Ronald John Vande Loo, "A Social Character Analysis of Individuals Scoring Open-minded on the Dogmatism Scale," Dissertation Abstracts International, XXXV (June 1975), 6120B-6121B.

³⁶Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind, pp. 45-46.

ideas are, then another approach becomes possible. That is to say that if the closedminded individual can use another standard by which to evaluate the other and accept or reject them on a basis other than their ideas, it would become theoretically possible to accept an individual whose ideas have been rejected. Let's say, for example, that individuals were evaluated on the basis of hair color (red being the most attractive) rather than their ideas. Red heads would be the most sought after persons in the social group no matter how different their ideas while blondes and brunettes may not achieve social prominence even if their ideas were attractive.

By introducing the concept of opinionated acceptance and opinionated rejection Rokeach has weakened his overall argument. He has tried to assert that dogmatic or closedminded persons are intolerant of those with opposing views and accepting of those with similar beliefs. That would be true if acceptance and rejection were always opinionated. But the way in which he introduces the notion of opinionation indicates that it is not always present. That raises doubt about part of his definition of dogmatism.

While most studies that have been done substantiate Rokeach's theory, there are some exceptions that need to be noted. (Some major studies that support a link between dogmatism and acceptance include Daniel Finnigan's 1971 dissertation in which he extended Emmanuel Berger's classic study.³⁷ Berger had investigated the relationship of

³⁷Daniel William Finnigan, "Relationship of Openmindedness/Closemindedness to Certain Personality Characteristics Involving Self-Regard," Dissertation Abstracts International, XXX (October 1971), 2376B.

self-acceptance and other-acceptance.³⁸ Finnigan looked at the relationship of openmindedness/closedmindedness and self-regard. He found lower self-esteem among closedminded persons than openminded persons. Eulogy Gonzales-Tamayo reported in 1971 that there was a positive relationship between dogmatism and both self and others in his study.³⁹ Barbara Long's study of acceptance of others produced similar results.⁴⁰

Mary Anne Digenon (1972) investigated the relationship between dogmatism and tolerance/intolerance.⁴¹ Her subjects were divided by sex in three categories: religious Roman Catholic, lay Roman Catholic, and other Christians. Of those six groups the only one that showed a positive relationship between dogmatism and intolerance was the female Roman Catholic.

W. R. Passons (1968) had mixed results when experimenting with dogmatism and empathic sensitivity among counselors.⁴² (Though not the same as acceptance, empathic sensitivity would include an awareness of the other, an openness to understanding and feeling with them.) While

³⁸Emanuel M. Berger, "The Relation Between Expressed Acceptance of Self and Expressed Acceptance of Others," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, XLVII (October 1952), 778-782.

³⁹Eulogy Gonzalez-Tamayo, "Dogmatism, Self-Acceptance and Acceptance of Others among Spanish and American Students," Journal of Social Psychology, XCIV (1971), 15-25.

⁴⁰Barbara H. Long, "Catholic-Protestant Differences in Acceptance of Others," Sociology and Social Science Research, XLIX (1965), 166-172.

⁴¹Mary Anne Digenan, "The Relationship of Religious Orientation, Prejudice, and Dogmatism in Three Groups of Christian College Students," Dissertation Abstracts International, XXXIII (December 1972), 2789B-2790B.

⁴²W. R. Passons, "The Relationship of Counselor Characteristics and Empathic Sensitivity," Dissertation Abstracts, XXIX (1968), 2968A.

there was a positive correlation with filmed clients there was not with live clients.

Other studies more pointedly bring doubt on this part of Rokeach's theory. Dorothy Lee and Howard Ehrlich studied beliefs about self and others in relationship to dogmatism.⁴³ While they found the two statistically related the correlations were of such a low magnitude that they expressed doubt as to the importance of these variables to Rokeach's theory. As we have seen, however, there is a singular importance in these variables as they may affect the way in which others are accepted or rejected.

Two studies were done among nursing students. Doris Collins studied empathic ability and dogmatism and for her subjects they were not related.⁴⁴ Rose Lynn Sherr's dissertation very closely approached the study of opinionated acceptance and rejection discussed earlier.⁴⁵ She studied client's behavior related to the subjects' beliefs and found that they did not affect acceptance of these clients, even by dogmatic subjects.

Melvin Foulds used graduate counseling students to study the ability of dogmatic subjects to communicate positive regard, empathy,

⁴³Dorothy E. Lee and Howard J. Ehrlich, "Beliefs about Self and Others: A Test of the Dogmatism Theory," Psychological Reports, XXVIII (June 1971), 919-922.

⁴⁴Doris Louise Collins, "Empathic Ability and Dogmatism in Nursing Students," Dissertation Abstracts International, XXXIII (December 1972), 2609A.

⁴⁵Rose Lynn Sherr, "Dogmatism as a Factor in Preprofessionals' Evaluations of Persons with Physical Disabilities," Dissertation Abstracts International, XXXI (May 1971), 6164A.

and other facilitative conditions in counseling sessions.⁴⁶ He was surprised to discover that dogmatism was not related to that ability. That fact led him to suggest that the way in which dogmatism had been defined and explained needed to be investigated further.

Summary and Conclusions

One of the major contributions made by Rokeach is his assertion that the level of dogmatism is determined by the way ideas are held not by their content. This is why he could demonstrate that those who are more conservative may in fact be more openminded than those who are more liberal. It is possible to hold conservative views in an openminded way as well as in a closedminded way. And the same is true for liberal views.

Another major contribution he makes is his support of the need for each individual to develop his or her own value system rather than accept without serious consideration the pronouncements of others.

His contributions to the study of psychology and personality would harmonize with several important theological themes. They suggest a strong emphasis on grace for they advocate an open and accepting attitude toward self and others. They imply a positive doctrine of humankind in which the individual is trusted to have within the orientation toward life that would lead them to positively use the freedom and creativity of openness. And there is an affinity between his assertion that the individual need not rely on the authoritative statements of

⁴⁶Melvin L. Foulds, "Dogmatism and the Ability to Communicate Facilitative Conditions During Counseling," Counselor Education and Supervision, XI (December 1971), 110-114.

other persons for their own values and the Christian emphasis on personal salvation.

As was mentioned early in this chapter, Rokeach is primarily describing the way dogmatism functions. While his beliefs and values are sometimes implied, the thrust of his energy revolves around studies and analysis of how dogmatism works in human beings. It appears that his study has led him to see dogmatism as a negative, destructive system that disrupts rather than enhances human relationships. He seems to leave no room in the concept of dogmatism for the notion of dogma. That leaves unsettled the question of where firm conviction and strongly held beliefs might fit in--or if they can be allowed at all without leading to rejection and hostility.

Chapter 3

UNCONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF OTHERS AS DESCRIBED BY

CARL ROGERS AND PAUL TILlich

Few persons have had a more profound impact on today's world than Carl Rogers and Paul Tillich. Both have thought creatively, researched thoroughly, organized systematically, written voluminously, spoken frankly, and acted courageously. Both have inspired praise and apostleship as well as criticism.

Rogers was born an American and is a social scientist. Tillich was born in Russia, came to the U.S. from Germany, and was a theologian. As a writer, Rogers is usually gentle, flowing, easily understood and takes a direct, positive approach to his subjects. Tillich, on the other hand, reads more complexly, appears more demanding, and requires the strict attention of his readers.

Despite these obvious differences, they have a lot in common. Rogers has demonstrated his ability to carry out and precisely report rigorous research. He has also shown the capacity to demand careful concentration to grasp his meanings, as he did in "A Theory of Therapy, Personality, and Interpersonal Relationships, as Developed in the Client-Centered Framework," a chapter in Koch's book. Tillich wrote articles and books which demonstrate his ability to express his thoughts directly and make them easily understood. So they each have the capacity to write in a way usually associated with the other.

Each was interested in and acquainted with the other's primary field of study. Rogers, though a behavioral scientist, has a firsthand

acquaintance with theology. He attended Union Theological Seminary for two years and struggled with the relation of religion to life. Tillich, though a theologian, was interested in psychology and had personal contacts with some of this century's leading psychotherapists. For Tillich too the relation of religion to life was an important subject to which he gave serious thought and about which he wrote in The Courage to Be.

One area in which they share similar convictions is their view of unconditional acceptance. Though they may label that experience differently--Rogers as unconditional positive regard, Tillich as part of love--and approach its discussion from different disciplines--Rogers in the realm of human relationships, Tillich usually in the Divine-human relationship--their conclusions are worth comparing. They both see it as a necessary facet of a fulfilling life, both explain it as part of a healthy relationship, and for both it becomes an important part of their theoretical system.

First we will see how Carl Rogers approaches the subject as unconditional positive regard and fits it into his theoretical framework. Then we will see how Paul Tillich discusses it as love and how that relates to his theological system. Finally we will see what their views have in common and how they may be different from each other.

CARL ROGERS ON UNCONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE

Carl Rogers is above all else a person-centered person. Very early in his career he became that way. Rejecting the conservative religious views of his family, he went to Union Theological Seminary in

an effort to discover a way to resolve his philosophical questions.¹ His study led him away from the church and finally to the field of Clinical Psychology. His passion to restore personhood in people, to see them as capable and growth oriented, led him to develop Client-Centered Therapy.

The impact he has had on the field of therapy has been astounding, even to him. In a 1973 speech to the American Psychological Association meeting he said,

To me, as I try to understand the phenomenon, it seems that without knowing it I had expressed an idea whose time had come. It is as though a pond had become utterly still, so that a pebble dropped into it sent ripples out farther and farther, having an influence that could not be understood by looking at the pebble.²

He contrasts his person-centered approach with authoritarian approaches by pointing out that for the later the results are most important so that the end justifies the means. For him, the means is most important and the results aren't always consistent.³

His career has been filled with excursions into various fields in an effort to humanize policies and practices that inhibit the natural directiveness he sees in the human being. He has advocated a positive approach to growth in psychotherapy, urged that educators give their students freedom to learn, that politicians treat their constituents as responsible persons, that scientists "do away with the fear of creative

¹Carl Rogers, "A Theory of Therapy, Personality, and Interpersonal Relationships, as Developed in the Client-Centered Framework," in Sigmund Koch (ed.), Psychology: A Study of a Science (New York: McGraw Hill, 1959), III, 186.

²Richard I. Evans, Carl Rogers: The Man and His Ideas (New York: Dutton, 1975), p. 124.

³Carl Rogers, On Personal Power (New York: Delacorte Press, 1977), p. 22.

subjective speculation,"⁴ and most recently that physicians' training be set up to encourage them to treat persons not illnesses.

The System

The system under which he addresses these issues is not complex. In order for persons to best experience their positive potential, he defines three conditions that must be met: there must be harmony between inner feelings and outward expression, they must be accepted as they are, and they must be heard and understood. He most often calls these three conditions congruence, unconditional positive regard, and empathic understanding.

In the counseling relationship this suggests that, in order for counselees to make progress toward health, the counselor needs to create an atmosphere that will encourage the emergence of the natural positive potential within the counselees. The counselor does that by being open and consistently reflecting internal and external data (congruence), accepting the counselees without demanding that they change or perform in any particular way (unconditional positive regard), and understanding more than just the counselee's words but being in touch with the emotional perspective from which they speak (empathic understanding). To the degree that those conditions are present, he asserts, positive growth will take place.

The system was developed to describe the ultimate counseling relationship as he saw it. But it is not altered when he speaks about politics, science, business, or any other profession or setting where

⁴William R. Coulson and Rogers (eds.), Man and the Science of Man (Columbus: Merrill, 1968), p. 70.

people are in contact with one another. The quality of their individual personhood and relationships are enhanced to the degree that these conditions are present or is impeded to the degree that they are absent.

Relationship of the Conditions

Rogers doesn't dwell on the relationship of the conditions to each other. His usual plan is to describe each one individually then talk about their mutual importance. Nor does he comment on the order in which they are presented: first congruence, then unconditional positive regard, and finally empathic understanding.

It does seem, however, that the sequence is a logical one. The congruence of the counselor is a first step in setting the tone of the encounter: Is it to be open? Is it to be honest? Must some things be held back until later or not revealed at all? etc. By being congruent, the counselor is providing a model for the counselee to follow.

As the counselees, courage rising to the occasion, begin to share themselves, the need for unconditional acceptance arrives. Now the counselor who has focused on personal reactions and kept that up to date is confronted with another person: sad, hostile, sensuous, sloppy, lazy, manipulative, joyful, naive, etc. Some response will come and for best results, according to Rogers, that response needs to be unconditionally accepting.

Finally, when the counselor allows himself or herself to openly accept the counselees, he or she is able to empathically enter the other's world, see it through their windows and watch life through their eyes. Without the congruence that encouraged openness, that called for acceptance, that brought intimacy, this could not take place.

Or could it? Revelation of even negative behavior and feelings does take place apart from congruence. Understanding of another's perspective is possible without unconditional positive regard.

I suggest that the level of intimacy is the measure to determine the effectiveness of the growing environment. Each of the conditions may be present apart from the others, but without a degree of each one little intimacy exists, i.e. defenses are still up preserving the status quo and negating growth. Thus Rogers has made a valid point by including all three as essential to the growing process.

A case could be easily made for a relationship beginning at any step and progressing through the other two, however. One could at first express empathic understanding, for example, then come to unconditional positive regard and congruence. So, even though the sequence is logical it does not appear to be essential.

That also suggests that the three conditions may not be inextricably related to each other. They can exist separately. The one least intertwined with the others seems to be congruence. Rogers justifiably asserts the need for its presence in creating a fully productive environment for personal enrichment, but it is primarily a sign of what can be, a challenge to plunge in and risk. As such it forecasts what the future can be for the counselees thus providing hope in the present.

Its connection with the other two conditions is that of communicating their existence. In this role it is essential to the growth process as it lets the counselees experience being prized and understood. But it is not essential to the existence of either unconditional positive regard or empathic understanding for both could be present internally without being expressed externally.

As for unconditional positive regard, it is the primary focus of this chapter and will be dealt with further. For now let it be said that its relationship to congruence has already been stated: congruence insures that what is felt internally is communicated externally. As for its relationship with empathic understanding, it could not long survive without this compliment. Unconditional positive regard opens the counselor to the counselees, makes him or her accepting and willing to share and receive time, ideas, and emotions. In that environment of openness and intimate sharing, empathic understanding is sure to follow. Empathic understanding then is the sure result of unconditional positive regard because unconditional positive regard ushers in empathic understanding.

If we say that unconditional positive regard never exists for long without empathic understanding, is the reverse also true? Is empathic understanding always accompanied by unconditional positive regard? That depends on one's definition of "empathic." It is taken to mean only that one rationally understands another, the possibility of these two conditions existing separately is much greater than if it is understood to mean that one emotionally enters into the world of another. It is possible to clearly understand another's position, experience the emotional turmoil from which it rises and to which it gives rise, yet be unwilling to unconditionally accept that other. That unwillingness would certainly limit the intimacy of the relationship and thus inhibit growth, but empathic understanding does not necessarily announce the presence or immanent presence of unconditional positive regard. Its relationship to congruence, however, is the same as that of unconditional positive regard. It can exist without being expressed but intimacy and growth is hampered.

In summary, congruence is not necessary to insure the existence of either unconditional positive regard or empathic understanding, but does provide for a clear expression of their presence and is thus important in Roger's growing atmosphere. Unconditional positive regard is closely followed by empathic understanding and is accurately communicated by congruence. Empathic understanding can exist independently, its presence is clearly stated by congruence, and as it is in concert with unconditional positive regard the level of intimacy is increased.

This sequence of steps begins to sound quite mechanistic. Almost as if they were a programmable series of behaviors that could be put on or taken off like layers of clothing. One must remember that they are concerned with the quality of human relationships and if they became affected or feigned the relationship would be negatively influenced. They really describe a person more than an environment. This point is reinforced by the concept of congruence: if these steps simply became mechanized behaviors acted out by a bored or hostile counselor, they would not be congruent with the counselor's true self and thus that important condition would not be present.

Unconditional Positive Regard

From this perspective of Roger's way of describing ideal human relationships, we turn specifically to his view of unconditional positive regard. He wrote for many years about the idea before using that phrase to describe it. In 1939 he was already talking about the importance of "secure affection" for the child and dealing with the results

of rejection.⁵ In 1942 he wrote about the need for the counselor to accept even the negative feelings of counselees.⁶ In his Client-Centered Therapy volume of 1951 there is a long section of acceptance.⁷ In 1954 he associated "unconditional" and "acceptance" in describing the climate in which the growth potential of the individual is released. He said that climate is one of "genuine acceptance of the client as a person of unconditional worth."⁸

In a 1957 article reprinted in 1961, he uses the phrase "unconditional positive regard." It was coined by a graduate student of his at the University of Chicago in 1954, Stanley Standal, and Rogers says it describes what he had called acceptance.⁹ For several years he used that phrase almost exclusively. For example, "acceptance" isn't even in the index of the 1967 book he edited, The Therapeutic Relationship and Its Impact.

But by 1969 and 1970 the reverse was true and "unconditional positive regard" was not indexed. Seldom after that did he use it. Other terms were substituted and equated with acceptance and unconditional positive regard, though he said unconditional positive regard was more

⁵Carl Rogers, The Clinical Treatment of the Problem Child (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1939), p. 8.

⁶Carl Rogers, Counseling and Psychotherapy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1942), pp. 37-38, 40.

⁷Carl Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1951), p. 41.

⁸Carl Rogers and Rosalind F. Symond (eds.), Psychotherapy and Personality Change (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 4.

⁹Carl Rogers, On Becoming a Person (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961), p. 283.

satisfactory.¹⁰ He called it love¹¹ and agape.¹² He also refers to it as prizing, trusting unconditionally,¹³ and nonpossessive caring.¹⁴

Definition. Rogers himself describes the concept like this:

By acceptance I mean a warm regard for him as a person of unconditional self-worth--of value no matter what his condition, his behavior, or his feelings. It means a respect and liking for him as a separate person, a willingness for him to possess his own feelings in his own way. It means an acceptance of and regard for his attitudes of the moment, no matter how negative, or positive, no matter how much they may contradict other attitudes he has held in the past.¹⁵

Because of his own preference for the accuracy of the phrase unconditional positive regard, let's look at that as an outline for his view of the concept of acceptance.

By "unconditional" he repeatedly emphasizes that the acceptance is to be without judgment. The counselor is to be accepting but not demanding.¹⁶ There is no manipulation of counselees, no controlling of the individual or relationship by giving or withholding this acceptance.¹⁷ Counselees have the right to say or not say whatever they wish with no fear of it being considered good or bad by the counselor.

¹⁰Rogers, "A Theory of Therapy," p. 208.

¹¹Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy, p. 159.

¹²Carl Rogers and Barry Stevens, Person to Person: The Problem of Being Human; A New Trend in Psychology (Lafayette, CA: Real People Press, 1967), p. 94.

¹³Carl Rogers, Freedom to Learn (Columbus: Merrill, 1969), p. 109.

¹⁴Rogers, On Personal Power, p. 10.

¹⁵Rogers, On Becoming a Person, p. 34.

¹⁶Carl Rogers and John L. Wallen, Counseling with Returned Servicemen (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1946), p. 22.

¹⁷Rogers, On Personal Power, p. 11.

This acceptance is simply that: the "simple acceptance, . . . of an 'm-hum' type of response that does no more than indirect acceptance and understanding."¹⁸ It isn't the praise of fame or success because that involves some form of judgment and evaluation.¹⁹ This tendency to evaluate; to agree or disagree with what one thought was said, is the greatest barrier to communication between persons, he says.²⁰

Another way he describes it is to say that if no one self-experience is perceived as more or less deserving of positive regard than any other, that is unconditional positive regard.²¹

From the same article comes his most technical definition of what he means by "positive regard." Positive regard for another occurs when my perceiving some self-experience in another makes a positive difference in my experiential field. And to perceive oneself as making a positive difference in the experiential field of another is receiving positive regard.²² In other words, it is an acceptance of whatever the client is at that moment, coming close to that person, perceiving their thoughts, emotions, and feelings. "As that happens he becomes not only understandable but good and desirable. . . ."²³

¹⁸Rogers and Wallen, p. 142.

¹⁹Carl Rogers and G. Marian Kinget, Psychoterapie et Relations Humaines (2nd ed.; Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1965), I, 145.

²⁰Carl Rogers and F. J. Roethlisberger, "Barriers and Gateways to Communication," in David A. Kolb, Irwin M. Rubin, and James M. McIntyre (eds.), Organizational Psychology (3d ed.; Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1974), p. 244.

²¹Rogers, "A Theory of Therapy . . .," p. 208.

²²Ibid., pp. 207-208.

²³Rogers, On Personal Power, p. 86.

This emphasis on accepting the individual is equally important to Rogers' view of encounter groups. He lets the group decide what they will do, how they want to do it, and what they want to discuss. He doesn't push anyone to be involved if they don't care to be, and trusts the group to get what it wants from the experience.²⁴

There are several degrees of unconditional positive regard as outlined by Charles B. Truax. In the first the therapist is actively giving advice or giving clear negative regard. In the second the therapist responds mechanically and passively thus communicating negative regard. In the third the therapist communicates regard, but it is possessive and controlling. In the fourth the therapist communicates unconditional positive regard in all but a few personal areas. In the fifth the therapist has total unconditional positive regard, directing the counselee only to share personally relevant material but allowing freedom beyond that.²⁵

Source. In 1954 Stanley Standal, Rogers' doctoral student who coined the phrase "unconditional positive regard," investigated the need for positive regard and concluded that it was learned in early infancy. For several years Rogers agreed with that conclusion, believing that it was not instinctive or inherent but that the human desire for acceptance developed during the early days and months of life.²⁶

²⁴Carl Rogers, On Encounter Groups (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), pp. 48-51.

²⁵Carl Rogers (ed.), The Therapeutic Relationship and Its Impact (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), pp. 556-578.

²⁶Rogers, "A Theory of Therapy," p. 208.

One of Rogers' strongest assets is his willingness to reevaluate his own conclusions and make adaptations or changes in them. This is a case in point. As time went by and studies began to indicate that infants, even in the earliest stages of life, developed abnormally or died if deprived of human affection, Rogers changed his mind. In an interview with Willard Frick he recanted his former view that the desire for love was learned. He now sees it as an innate need of the human organism.²⁷

This change in his opinion does not at all detract from his theory, but in fact enhances it. Now unconditional acceptance exists as a central part of human life; a need that is part of the basic thrust of the being. Its study becomes even more central, if possible, than it was before.

How is that need satisfied? By receiving unconditional acceptance. Is one obliged then to wait passively until some benevolent person bestows that gift? Or can one go seeking those from whom acceptance is likely? Both approaches are very common. There are many who feel trapped by circumstances that deprive them of the acceptance they instinctively need, but not knowing what else to do they wait in frustration hoping that by some miracle or magic their needs will be satisfied. Others become aggressive in seeking out what they want, demanding that those who can fill their needs do so. They are only partially successful for to ask for acceptance already indicates that at best it is not being expressed and very possibly is not present at all.

Rogers suggests another way. He says that giving and receiving unconditional acceptance is reciprocal. As persons give it to another

²⁷Willard B. Frick, Humanistic Psychology (Columbus: Merrill, 1971), p. 90.

the giver experiences the satisfaction of their need for that which they gave away.²⁸ That is to say that as they are accepting of others they begin to perceive themselves as being accepted. By this method individuals can avoid the frustration of waiting passively for someone to accept them, and the frustration of aggressively asking for what may not be there. By initiating the unconditional acceptance of others they can actively court an atmosphere in which another's growth potential is enhanced as well as provide for the satisfaction of their own instinctive needs.

Results of unconditional positive regard. The results of the presence of unconditional positive regard are several. One has already been mentioned: the presence of this condition is bound to be followed by another condition, empathic understanding. As persons accept others as precious individuals regardless of their behavior, the defenses that separate individuals are lowered. The lowering of defenses encourages the sharing of more facts, ideas, impressions, emotions, and feelings. As the volume of that data increases, the acceptors become more and more immersed in the others' world, better and better acquainted with their perspective. The level of empathy and understanding naturally increases. So the first result is the appearance of empathic understanding.

This is significant in that it is only in this sequence--unconditional positive regard empathic understanding--that two of Rogers' three conditions for growth will inevitably result from the initial presence of one. That leaves only one condition to be included in order

²⁸Rogers, "A Theory of Therapy," p. 223.

for his optimum environment to be created. This fact establishes unconditional positive regard as the most important of the three conditions. Perhaps this is why some of the ultimate results of the total atmosphere are attributed to this single condition.

Rogers sets up the logic like this. Unconditional positive regard is prizing what is in the client. It is given without conditions regardless of behavior. That gives the other the freedom to be whatever feelings are within.²⁹ As that freedom is experienced, the second result of unconditional acceptance occurs: an environment is created where change is more likely to result.³⁰ It is not always possible for that environment to be ideal. Unconditional positive regard is not a "should" for Rogers or it would deny the counselor's individual freedom to have negative feelings toward the client. But, he says, unless it is frequently present, positive change isn't very likely.³¹

Change is made more likely by (1) lowering the defenses that preserve the status quo³² and helps persons avoid the real issue,³³ (2) interrupting the negative reaction and rejection they're used to thus encouraging them to adopt a new way to respond,³⁴ and (3) providing the safety to become creative and experiment.³⁵ In the presence of unconditional positive regard all three do take place.

²⁹Rogers and Stevens, p. 94.

³⁰Rogers, On Personal Power, p. 10.

³¹Ibid.

³²Rogers, On Becoming a Person, pp. 63-64.

³³Rogers, Counseling and Psychotherapy, pp. 134, 137.

³⁴Rogers, Client Centered Therapy, p. 50.

³⁵Rogers, On Becoming a Person, p. 357.

He approaches that description from another viewpoint when he talks about the value of allowing negative feelings to be expressed. If it is the positive potential within the individual that is growth producing, why spend time experiencing the negative? Because, he says, negative feelings must be expressed, accepted, recognized, and clarified in order to allow the same process to take place with positive feelings.³⁶ Or, as he said recently, rage needs to be heard, understood, and accepted without reservation, then healing takes place as if it were a miracle.³⁷

One of his major concerns is to remove the dissociation of the conscious and unconscious organismic process toward actualization. He sees that as the basis of all psychological and social pathology in human beings,³⁸ and identifies conditional love and esteem as one potential cause of that dissociation.³⁹ Conditional love is a cultural influence that encourages us to introject external values as the basis for acceptance and consequently mistrust our own inclinations and experiences. These external values that face us with conditional love thus become the root of the individual's disintegration.⁴⁰ The inner self is at odds with others.

The solution he suggests is the application of the unconditional acceptance of others → unconditional self-acceptance → unconditional acceptance of others reciprocal cycle. He sees individuals moving away from facades, oughts, meeting expectations, and pleasing others toward

³⁶Rogers, Counseling and Psychotherapy, pp. 37-38, 40.

³⁷Rogers, On Personal Power, p. 133.

³⁸Ibid., p. 248.

³⁹Ibid., p. 249.

⁴⁰Ibid., pp. 246-247.

being process, being complexity, being open to experience, accepting of others, trusting of self.⁴¹

He stresses that by encouraging that transition, power is not given to the individual to be what they are. Rather the power each one has is just never taken away.⁴² The persons that result from such an approach are ones who are genuinely caring, who help people without thought of reward but just because they need help, who don't discriminate as to whom they help.⁴³ They prize individuals for what they are, without regard for sex, race, status, or wealth.⁴⁴ He describes the most trustworthy individuals in our world as those who are open both to their inner and outer experiences, who trust their inclinations yet include data from objects and persons outside themselves.⁴⁵ They do, however, trust their own experience as more valid than pronouncements of external authorities and do not allow popes, kings, or scholars to dictate what their decisions will be.⁴⁶ The similarities between these persons and Rokeach's description of openminded persons are striking.

Evaluation of Rogers' view of unconditional acceptance. Rogers is no doubt correct when he says change is more likely to occur if all behavior is unconditionally accepted. Negative reactions do inhibit the

⁴¹Carl Rogers, A Therapist's View of Personal Goals (Wallingford, PA: Pendle Hill, 1962), pp. 7-18.

⁴²Rogers, On Personal Power, p. xii.

⁴³Evans, pp. 162-163.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 174.

⁴⁵Rogers, On Personal Power, p. 250.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 274.

behaviors with which they are associated. So the traditional method of punishing to restore and maintain stability is effective in reducing changes in the status quo.

A paragraph in which that point is most forcefully made is this:

It is as [the counselor] is willing for death to be the choice that life is chosen; for neuroticism to be the choice, that a healthy normality is chosen. The more completely he acts upon his central hypothesis, the more convincing is the evidence that the hypothesis is correct.⁴⁷

That brings to mind the way in which Scripture presents God's attitude toward human choice. Repeatedly the alternatives are presented: the trees in the garden of Eden which demonstrated the focus of Adam and Eve's loyalty, the mountains of Ebal and Gerizim that promised blessings and curses to Israel, the individual challenges of Joshua at the border of Canaan, Elijah on Mount Carmel, Peter after Pentecost, etc. Even the commands of God include the possibility of disregarding them.

Misunderstood, however, the concept of freedom and unconditional acceptance could give rise to family and social upheaval. Were individuals indiscriminately given the freedom to act as they please some degree of chaos would result. It is necessary to approach this subject briefly, trite as it may appear.

Thomas Gordon, writing in Rogers' book, recognizes this problem and says there are limits on acceptance. For example, an employer can't be accepting of late arrivals by employees. But the ideal is to be as accepting as possible.⁴⁸

⁴⁷Rogers, Client Centered Therapy, p. 49.

⁴⁸Ibid., pp. 355-358.

Rogers himself suggests some limits to this freedom. When discussing a child's right to chose, he says that

The effort is also made to allow the child the right to chose, in any situation in which he seems capable of bearing the consequences of his choice. This is an expanding process, in which increasing autonomy is given to the child and adolescent, autonomy bounded only by the feelings of those who are close to the youngster.⁴⁹

This suggests that there is a gradual learning process involved, that the child is not able to always make responsible decisions. It also suggests that there needs to be some external control on the freedom of the individual. With these limitations I agree and they lead me to wonder if these principles might not need to be applied to "adults" who are also, to a greater or lesser degree, immature. By suggesting the need for some limits, Rogers has reintroduced the presence of judgment and evaluation.

This is the point at which I find it difficult to follow his view. There are times when some degree of external values, judgment, and evaluation seem necessary. Just where is that point? In the context of the statement above, it could be at the level of determining what consequences the child was able to bear, or it could be when the child's behavior interferes with the feelings of those around them, and perhaps it includes both.

If it is on the ability of the child or person to bear the consequences of their choice, I agree. The legitimate choices one has are those for which the individual can suffer or enjoy the results. At times that makes life harsh, but it is realistic. Yet there are occasions when the consequences are not foreseen or understood by the one attempting to

⁴⁹Rogers, On Personal Power, p. 30.

make the decision and at those times--and if the consequences would be unbearable--external intervention would seem appropriate.

If judgment and evaluation enter on the second point--the "feelings" of those who are nearby, I become uneasy. That could become capricious. Perhaps the use of another word like "freedom" instead of feelings would convey his thought. Certainly the free choice of one individual needs to be controlled so that it doesn't jeopardize the free choice of another. (The issue of conflicting needs, minority vs. majority wishes, etc. is not meant to be included in this discussion. Those problems are well discussed by ethicists. I'm speaking here of matters of preference not moral concerns.)

Rogers does believe that every individual ought to be allowed the freedom to live and do as he or she wishes as long as that doesn't interfere with others' freedom to do as they wish. And he is consistent with that view even to the point of urging more openness to rejecting traditional values and experimenting with new ones. One area to which he has devoted much attention in this regard is family structure. He feels it would be advantageous to support trial approaches to new marriage and family styles. He becomes almost pompous when he bemoans society's old-fashioned condemnations and calls them "ridiculous."⁵⁰ He would defend this stand as a struggle to allow some to be what they wish in the face of those who are trying to impose their will on others. And perhaps he would answer the charge that this would erode society's values thus

⁵⁰Carl Rogers, Becoming Partners (New York: Delacorte Press, 1972), pp. 213-214.

infringing on traditionalist's behavior by suggesting that traditionalists may choose what they like--for themselves.

But doesn't unconditional positive regard exclude any kind of behavior, even asocial or anti-social types? Can't one be accepting of another without accepting their behavior? Not really, says Rogers. The good therapist would accept even anti-social behavior "as a natural consequence of the circumstances." Acceptance, according to him, doesn't allow any room for judgment either of the individual or the behavior.⁵¹

The positive potential in these and other suggestions Rogers has made are very apparent. As with Rokeach, they would harmonize with the important theological notions of grace, a positive view of humankind, and an emphasis on personal salvation.

On the surface it seems that he, too, is describing a system in which, at both the theoretical and attitudinal levels, dogmatism would be the opposite of unconditional acceptance. There appears to be no room left in his view of unconditional acceptance for the firm convictions of dogma or the closedmindedness of dogmatism.

Yet there are some indications that this issue isn't completely described that easily. It has already been pointed out that while he says there is no room for judgment in acceptance, he has reintroduced the idea of judgment and evaluation elsewhere.⁵² The reintroduction comes ten years after the exclusive statement so perhaps there has been some adjustment in his thinking on this point.

⁵¹Rogers, The Therapeutic Relationship . . . , pp. 103-104.

⁵²Rogers, "A Theory of Therapy . . . ," pp. 209-210.

There is also the possibility of that kind of reintroduction in his view of congruence. As part of a healthy growth environment, congruence challenges an openness with self as well as toward the other. Might that not include personal values and convictions? Perhaps congruence would provide the structure through which the strong beliefs of dogma could be shared in a constructive way.

PAUL TILLICH ON UNCONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE

When Rogers talks about how giving and receiving unconditional positive regard is reciprocal, he sounds much like Paul Tillich who describes love as that which is sacrificed but never dies, that which is given away but never lost.⁵³

Rogers speaks as a counselor about change and growth and actualization. Tillich speaks as a theologian about sin, alienation from God, and the need to be restored to harmony with the Ground of our Being.

There are several kinds of theologians, however, and Tillich sees himself as a philosophical theologian. He combines philosophical descriptions about the human condition and the structure of existence with theological reflections on the meaning of human existence.

The System

Tillich takes this basic approach and expands it to organize his theological system. From his description of the human situation, questions rise to which he addresses theological answers. There are five

⁵³Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951-1963), I, 152.

basic parts to his Systematic Theology each of which correlates a philosophical question with a theological answer. The first section is an epistemological introduction, the concluding one is on history. The three central chapters contain the heart of the system and discuss the questions of being, existence, and life. The theological response to each of those concerns comes in the form of a member of the Trinity: "Being and God, Existence and the Christ," and "Life and the Spirit."

In the first section he introduces the polarities that for him describe the state of human being: individualization and participation, dynamics and form, and freedom and destiny.⁵⁴ Each pole needs to be held in tension with its counterpart, though in life distortions of this balance are commonplace. The ambiguity of life is that one is both an individual apart from society and a part of society at large. Overemphasis of the individual pole brings the fear of isolation while overemphasis of participation brings the fear of losing personal identity. Again, ambiguous life faces one with the dynamics of change and the security of sameness. Overemphasis on dynamics brings meaningless change while overemphasis on form brings blind traditionalism. Finally, the ambiguity of life presents one as being both free and destined. Overemphasis on freedom ignores the experience of the past while overemphasis on destiny carries bondage to the past.

Associated with human existence is a fundamental fear of non-existence. Tillich defines this in the second section of the systematics, "Existence and the Christ." He describes existence itself as standing

⁵⁴For an excellent description of Tillich's system and his essential concepts, John Wiley Nelson, "An Inquiry into the Methodological Structure of Paul Tillich's 'Systematic Theology,'" Encounter, XXXV (Summer 1974), 171-183.

out of non-being, either absolute non-being (ouk on) or relative non-being (me on). Nelson explains that with those two categories basic anxieties are associated. With ouk on the anxiety is of categorical finitude: the fear of loosing the present in which one has temporarily avoided absolute non-being. With me on he sees two dialectically related anxieties: the fear of dreaming innocence and the fear of the actualization of freedom.⁵⁵ He then goes on to link these anxieties of being with the three sets of polarities mentioned earlier: the anxiety of categorical finitude with the tension of freedom and destiny, the anxiety of dreaming innocence with the tension of individualization and participation, and the anxiety of actualization of freedom with the tension of dynamics and form.

In the third section of Tillich's system, he introduces three life-processes as part of his discussion on "life and the Spirit." They are: self-integration, self-creativity, and self-transcendence. As each process develops it follows a pattern of self-identity, self-alternation, and return-to-self. Each has a principle and each principle a telos. The principle of self-integration is centeredness and its telos is identity. The principle of self-creativity is change and its telos is growth. The principle of self-transcendence is finitude and its telos is fulfillment. It is not difficult to see how these processes relate to the polarities and anxieties already described. Self-integration has to do with the individualization-participation polarity and thus the me on anxiety of dreaming innocence. Self-creativity focuses on the dynamics-form polarity and faces the me on anxiety of actualization of freedom.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 176.

Self-transcendence deals with the freedom-destiny polarity and attempts to respond to the ouk on anxiety of categorical finitude. Table 1 outlines these relationships. (See following page.) In each case the state of being is expressed in a polarity. The ambiguity of life as described in terms of the polarity brings the existential anxiety described in the next line. That existential anxiety is resolved through the life process summarized in the following line using the principle and telos in the last lines.

Love

Within this general context, we turn specifically to Tillich's view of love. Simply stated, his definition of love is "the drive towards the reunion of the separated."⁵⁶ But that statement alone oversimplifies it. Love is the king pin in his understanding of life, humankind, and God. It is the foundation for his ontological system. In order to grasp his most basic concepts, one must place them within the framework he concisely defines as follows: "Life is being in actuality and love is the moving power of life. In these two sentences the ontological nature of love is expressed."⁵⁷

Not just the ontological nature of love is there described, but the source of life rhythms is suggested as well. Love is part of life, inextricably bound up with the very nature of our existence. We all

⁵⁶Tillich, III, 134.

⁵⁷Paul Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 25.

Table 1
A COORDINATED VIEW OF PAUL TILLICH'S SYSTEM

System Section:	Being and God	Being and the Christ	Life and the Spirit
Polarity:	Individualization- Participation	Dynamics-Form	Freedom-Destiny
Anxiety:	<u>me on</u> , Dreaming Innocence	<u>me on</u> , Actualization	<u>ouk on</u> , Categorical Finitude
Life Process:	Self-integration	Self-creativity	Self-transcendence
Principle:	Centeredness	Change	Finitude
Telos:	Identity	Growth	Fulfillment

participate in love either positively as attraction or negatively as hate.⁵⁸

There is movement within love between separation and reunion. Both are necessary conditions of love. Without separation there could be no reunion. Separation can mean two things: individualization or estrangement.⁵⁹ Individualization is simply recognizing the uniqueness of each individual. It is a normal and necessary condition of love; part of love's ebb and flow. Estrangement, on the other hand, is the result of sharp differences that drive a wedge between two who were once united. Love is still being experienced, but in this case negatively as hate. That wedge is sin.⁶⁰ But in both individualization and estrangement, love is experienced as the drive toward reunion.

That individualization is a necessity for love to function is evident in Tillich's definition of love as the drive to unite the separated. (It also allows him to harmonize the apparent inner conflict between withdrawal and socialization. And it gives added weight to his view of an idolatrous faith that would elevate one preliminary concern above others, deny their claims to legitimate distinctness, mold them after itself and thus destroy the possibility of love.⁶¹) Only in

⁵⁸Paul Tillich, "Being and Love," in Four Existentialist Theologians (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1958), p. 333.

⁵⁹Paul Tillich, "Reply," in Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall (eds.), The Theology of Paul Tillich (New York: Macmillan, 1952), p. 344.

⁶⁰Ibid.

⁶¹Paul Tillich, Dynamics of Faith (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), p. 115.

Christianity, he says, does love have both uniting and separating aspects.⁶²

That allows Christians to see differentness between themselves and others as a helpful not a threatening circumstance, for to experience separateness as love implies an underlying unity.⁶³ To be distinct in the present is to look back on original union and anticipate future union. It's only as one stands back and looks at the other as other that mutuality can be discovered. This is why Hammond summarizes Tillich's view of love as "discovery of identity in difference, or self in other."⁶⁴ The same concept applies to one's relationship to God. Differentness, even if it is estrangement, doesn't only indicate alienation but identity. One's distinctness from God demonstrates original identity in the Ground of Being. The differentness brings out the identity and transforms it to love.⁶⁵

Thus love seeks the unity of the separated and estranged, not the strange. It is not as if unrelated objects are being brought together but rather that those objects that have a basic affinity are being reunited.

The estrangement between God and humankind is part of the separation between the sacred and the secular. For Tillich this is the

⁶²Tillich, "Being and Love," p. 345.

⁶³Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice, p. 25.

⁶⁴Guyton B. Hammond, Man in Estrangement (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1965), p. 162.

⁶⁵Tillich, "Being and Love," p. 335.

supreme subject-object split and love's ultimate goal is to reunify the sacred and secular dimensions in all of life.⁶⁶

The ultimate goal for human life is reunity with the divine. Fulfillment doesn't come when physical needs are being satisfied. Life's intent is not striving for pleasure for the sake of pleasure. For Tillich, physical drives (food, protection, sex, etc.) aren't the power of life, love is. That being so, fulfillment comes in unity not in pleasure as such.⁶⁷

The qualities of love. It has become almost standard practice for both theologians and philosophers to discuss various types of love rather than love in general. Almost universally accepted as categories are the libido, philia, eros, and agape terms and connotations. Tillich uses that method also with an important distinction: he sees them as qualities of love not different types of love.

For him that means that they are interrelated. None is felt or expressed in isolation but in every act of love all are present.⁶⁸ Even if they aren't obvious, they exist by deficiency. So love is a kalai-descope with changing patterns due to the shifting emphasis on different ones of its qualities. But it is always a unit with the qualities reacting and relating with each other and never in isolation.

Love isn't just an emotion. If it were only an emotion it could not be commanded as Christ did ("love the Lord your God. . . , love your

⁶⁶Tillich, Systematic Theology, III, 243-244.

⁶⁷Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice, pp. 29-30.

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 5.

neighbor. . .") because emotions are involuntary.⁶⁹ Love is the drive toward reunion. But love includes emotion. Not of a sentimental paralyzing sort, but as the happy anticipation of reunion.⁷⁰ These two facets of love--the drive toward reunion and the emotional reaction to the prospect of reunion--are what unite the qualities of love for Tillich. Love in its loftiest form (agape) contains emotion and love in its most earthy form (libido) contains a desire for union.

It would seem most difficult to hold the extremities together: libido and agape. Yet Tillich does this in a very simple way. He uses epitymia ("desire") interchangeably with libido,⁷¹ a definition that makes it very easy to associate it with the drive toward reunion. He disagrees with the Freudian concept of libido being somehow below the dignity of the intellectual, spiritual part of human beings. Distorted libido would seek only its own pleasure through the other being, he admits, thus making reunion meaningless.⁷² But undistorted libido includes a just and pure desire for union.

He emphasizes eros and philia because of their relationship to each other. They are probably more closely connected than any other combination of qualities. Both contain epithymia so they both seek fulfillment through union with other beings. They represent polarities of that process: eros the transpersonal pole, philia the personal pole. So they always exist in each other in complimentary degrees.⁷³

⁶⁹Ibid., pp. 4-5.

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 27.

⁷¹Tillich, Systematic Theology, III, 137.

⁷²Ibid., II, 54.

⁷³Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice, p. 31.

That description of eros has set Tillich up for criticism by Hamilton at the next level. Hamilton contends that when Tillich calls love the reunion of the separated, then describes love as he has, he is making love eros and nothing but eros.⁷⁴ He feels Tillich smokescreens the issue to try and cover up the loss of people in the process. An eros that seeks unity doesn't seek the other, as Tillich says, but only unity.⁷⁵ Eros thus takes over love and love takes over faith.⁷⁶ So goes Hamilton's argument.

The kind of eros Hamilton is concerned with is distorted. Tillich does admit that love as a combination of agape and eros is implied in faith,⁷⁷ explaining that the real meaning of eros is "knowledge" or "truth." Thus agape drives us toward union with God, eros toward knowledge of or truth about Him.⁷⁸ But Tillich's repeated emphasis on agape counteracts Hamilton's concern on this point.

Despite the close relationships between libido, eros and philia and in spite of the very positive comments he makes about their undistorted expressions, all depend on agape for realization. Because they can all become self-centered and resist reunion, agape is needed.⁷⁹ It

⁷⁴Kenneth Hamilton, The System and the Gospel (New York: Macmillan, 1963), p. 102.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 104.

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 105.

⁷⁷Tillich, Dynamics of Faith, p. 115.

⁷⁸Paul Tillich, Biblical Religion and the Search for the Ultimate Reality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), pp. 70-72.

⁷⁹Tillich, "Being and Love," p. 345.

cuts through each one and eliminates their ambiguities.⁸⁰ It is the only quality that is independent of changing needs and desires. It links all of life and love to their Ground. It affirms the other unconditionally.⁸¹ It can transform and judge the other qualities of love.⁸² Only agape is unambiguous.⁸³

Love as the absolute principle. These sweeping claims for agape make it the candidate par excellence to be the absolute. Tillich selects it as such for several reasons. First, because it is not a law but a statement of fact.⁸⁴ It is love as a principle rather than any particular culture's interpretation of love that he sees as the absolute.⁸⁵

He also suggests love because it is the only thing that can sacrifice itself without losing itself.⁸⁶ It can be both servant and master, accepted or rejected without losing its value.

That leads to the third reason for its selection: it can be both absolute and relative at the same time. While other ethical standards are exclusive in their claims to being absolute (and are thus either absolute or relative), love is always open to other alternatives even when it is only temporarily absolute.⁸⁷ Love is unconditional in its essence but conditional in its existence.⁸⁸ Because it is conditional in its existence and absolute in its essence, it fits all concrete situations. That is the strongest reason for suggesting it as the absolute.⁸⁹

⁸⁰Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice, p. 116.

⁸¹Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 280.

⁸²Ibid., III, 137.

⁸³Ibid., III, 135.

⁸⁴Ibid., III, 272.

⁸⁵Ibid., III, 160.

⁸⁶Ibid., I, 152.

⁸⁷Ibid., I, 152-153.

⁸⁸Ibid., III, 273.

⁸⁹Ibid., I, 152.

It may not provide all the answers, the actions through which it is expressed may vary, but it is always applicable and thus it is final revelation for Tillich.⁹⁰

How love originates and functions. The link of love that unites God and humanity is developed further when Tillich discusses the relationship of faith and love. Through love estranged human beings see their essential unity with God. But what brings that awareness? What produces love? He says the Spiritual Presence is responsible by producing faith and love. Faith is the state of being grasped by the transcendent unity of unambiguous life and love is the state of being taken into that transcendent unity.⁹¹ Faith characterizes the New Being in time and space while love (agape) characterizes the Divine life.⁹² That makes love greater than faith⁹³ yet faith remains the ultimate power behind love.⁹⁴ Without faith, which makes one aware that transcendent unity is possible, love would never exist. So, even though faith produces love and thus gains sequential precedence, love is preeminent because of the Divine unity it symbolizes.

All of this hinges, of course, on Tillich's description of faith as ultimate concern rather than faith as a set of doctrines. Faith as a set of doctrines would not always produce love whereas faith as ultimate concern implies the drive toward unity with that concern, i.e. love.⁹⁵

Another link between faith and love concerns how love is expressed. Tillich says love is always acted out, that it expresses itself in

⁹⁰Ibid.

⁹¹Ibid., III, 129.

⁹²Ibid., III, 138.

⁹³Ibid.

⁹⁴Tillich, Dynamics of Faith, p. 117.

⁹⁵Ibid., pp. 113-114.

works.⁹⁶ Love provides the link then between faith and works. Without faith and love works are only hypocritical attempts at unity with the ultimate concern. Love gives meaning to faith and channels action to accomplish its objectives. Again, faith and love must exist together or both are lost.

While he says in one place that love is the symbol of the divine life,⁹⁷ he also says that love, power, and justice are the symbols of the divine life.⁹⁸ He says that faith produces love and thus preceeds love,⁹⁹ yet he also asserts that love, power, and justice preceed everything that is and cannot be derived from anything that is.¹⁰⁰ It's evident that faith, love, power, and justice are all tied up in one package and can't be isolated from each other. Yet, he has analyzed them individually in various books and articles and their interrelationships haven't always been clarified. The closest he comes to it is a statement in "Being and Love" where he says that both power and justice are elements of love. He explains that they are inseparable in God (Being-itself) but are separate in finite beings.¹⁰¹ So one might say they are essentially one but existentially different.

To consider love apart from power is to establish a distortion of what love is, contends Tillich. Love then becomes "chaotic surrender" and power becomes blind force. Separating the two, as Albrecht Ritchie's

⁹⁶Ibid., p. 115.

⁹⁷Tillich, Systematic Theology, III, p. 138.

⁹⁸Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice, p. 111.

⁹⁹Tillich, Dynamics of Faith, p. 115.

¹⁰⁰Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice, p. 21.

¹⁰¹Tillich, "Being and Love," p. 337.

school does, leaves a false impression of God (as a loving weakling or a powerful tyrant)¹⁰² and confuses the position of religion in social concerns.¹⁰³ Love must be protected by power and power directed by love.

When he talks about power he means the fear and force of compulsion. He agrees with Luther that, in order for love to function, it must have a suitable environment. Power is needed to destroy that which would destroy love. When doing that, power isn't something separate from love but part of love. Compulsion is love's strange work.¹⁰⁴

The power aspect of love can be misused in both extremes: abuse and lack of use. In the first case, compulsion must only be utilized to destroy that part of another which makes reunion impossible. It must not destroy the individual or even eradicate all differences. It's an attack on a threatening environment not a person. When abused, compulsion prevents or hinders unity rather than enhances it.¹⁰⁵ On the other hand, if love isn't complemented by an active use of power, and is just the drive toward reunion, unity comes at any cost. Individuality is sacrificed in a misguided effort at solidity. When that happens, differences are abandoned and love becomes impossible (as we've seen). "Chaotic surrender" and eventual non-being are the result.

The power of being is the ability of the individual to overcome the non-being within.¹⁰⁶ The more power one has available the more non-being can be allowed. And, by the same token, larger amounts of useful power allow greater distinctions between individuals. The larger the

¹⁰²Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice, pp. 11-12.

¹⁰³Ibid., p. 12.

¹⁰⁴Ibid., p. 49.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., p. 50.

¹⁰⁶Ibid., p. 48.

gap is that can be bridged by love, the stronger that love is. The viability of love is determined by the amount of non-being or separation with which it can be faced without being overcome. Love and power don't exclude each other. They operate in a direct relationship that allows one to grow only as the other increases and if one is lost the other is extinguished.

Much of what has been said about love and power can be said about love and justice. Love is the principle of justice, Tillich says, and justice is the form of the encounter of being with being, the form of the movement of the separated toward union.¹⁰⁷ Justice is primarily concerned with preserving as unique and distinct that which is to be united.¹⁰⁸ Whatever attempts to destroy that separateness is resisted and broken by justice¹¹⁰ (whereas power destroys it by fear and compulsion).

As with power, justice and love must go together. Love without justice would be impossible since there would be no separated to unite. And, though I didn't find a statement to this effect, justice without love in his system would become a fanatical fight for isolationism (individuality with no drive toward union). He does point out that love tempers justice by showing what is just in the concrete situation¹¹¹ and that "the creative element in justice is love."¹¹² This introduces the

¹⁰⁷Ibid., pp. 56-57.

¹⁰⁸Ibid., p. 71.

¹⁰⁹Tillich, Systematic Theology, II, 174.

¹¹⁰Ibid., I, 283.

¹¹¹Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice, p. 82.

¹¹²Ibid., p. 83.

dynamic aspect of love and justice. Tillich calls it "creative justice" and talks of its functions as listening, giving, and forgiving.¹¹³ It's a unique way of tying God's grace to His desire for us to be different from not confluent with Him.

In summary, faith, love, power, and justice are all very closely interrelated. Faith produces love which has powerful and just aspects. Love is the power of being, the drive toward reunity. Power is the ability to overcome non-being, the drive toward reunity. Power is the ability to overcome non-being and is actualized in the encounter of power with power.¹¹⁴ As the power of being, love is produced by faith and is actualized through power in the form of justice.

The human results of love. Keeping in mind that Tillich's descriptions of love, especially in the previous section, are primarily portrayals of God's love for humanity, let's make some applications with those concepts to human love. Tillich does this himself so the analogies are not foreign to his thought, but it must be noted that the result is more a description of what human love might be than what human love is.

The necessity of unconditional acceptance in Tillich's view of love has already been pointed out. The unique peculiarities of each individual is what makes reunion (of their essential sameness) a possibility. The value of this uniqueness is protected by justice. Justice prevents one from sacrificing one's own or another's individual characteristics. It prevents self-condemnation and despair.

The idea of acceptance is related to the power of love also. One's ability to be accepting of differences is related to one's power

¹¹³Ibid., p. 84.

¹¹⁴Ibid., p. 67.

of being. The more power one has the more accepting of differences one can be. That is true both in relationship with others and in one's attitude toward self.

The source of self-acceptance, says Tillich, lies outside the self. It's only as one is accepted by another that self-acceptance is legitimate. Otherwise the individual is ignoring any basis for the acceptance and is complacent, or is setting personal standards for acceptance and is arbitrary.¹¹⁵ He turns to justice for the solution saying that the condemning part of justice prevents self-complacency, the forgiving part of justice prevents self-condemnation, and the giving part of justice provides a center for the self from which self-control operates.¹¹⁶

God's love for humanity. It is ultimately God's acceptance that allows one to accept oneself. In love there is the "in spite of" which makes it inseparable from grace.¹¹⁷ This love, expressed toward human beings by God as grace or forgiveness, is what Tillich calls "creative justice."¹¹⁸ But, though God accepts us unconditionally, in spite of our condition and in creative justice will forgive that which is against love, there is another side to His justice. If it were only forgiving then love would be chaotic surrender. Justice isn't only creative but also condemning. God's love not only forgives what is against it (its own work) but destroys what is against it (its strange work).¹¹⁹

¹¹⁵Ibid., p. 121.

¹¹⁶Ibid., p. 122.

¹¹⁷Tillich, Systematic Theology, III, 274.

¹¹⁸Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice, p. 66.

¹¹⁹Ibid., pp. 113-114.

Tillich consciously avoids describing God as a being who has love, but says that God is love and has shown Himself to us as love.¹²⁰ From another perspective, God is being-itself because life is described as separation and reunion and that's what God does: separates Himself from Himself in the Son and reunites Himself with Himself in the Spirit.¹²¹ And, since God is being-itself and God is love, then being itself is love.¹²² God as love, expressing Himself to us as love, is symbolized in the "in spite of" of agape. But a "because of" is also there, though Tillich doesn't emphasize that. As Hamilton points out, Tillich's view of God's unmotivated love also implies that that love is based on the inherent unity of God and human beings.¹²³

That kind of open reaching out prompts positive reaction. Instead of creating rigid laws and requirements it spawns a love which voluntarily does what the law commands.¹²⁴ It spurs creativity and accomplishment.¹²⁵ God's love elicits human love for, though love is commanded because it's the power of reunion that overcomes the estrangement.¹²⁶ Human love for God is not agape in the usual sense because there is no "in spite of" or forgiveness involved.¹²⁷ Yet Tillich can

¹²⁰Tillich, "Being and Love," p. 334.

¹²¹Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice, p. 107.

¹²²Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 279.

¹²³Hamilton, pp. 143-144.

¹²⁴Tillich, Systematic Theology, III, 272.

¹²⁵Tillich, "Being and Love," p. 341.

¹²⁶Tillich, Systematic Theology, II, 81.

¹²⁷*Ibid.*, I, 281.

say it includes all four qualities of love¹²⁸ because of a uniting of eros and agape.¹²⁹ And the real significance of loving God is that by doing that one is loving love as the ultimate, as being-itself.¹³⁰

Loving God brings unity with other human beings from whom we are alienated, says Tillich.¹³¹ It works like a wheel: individual spokes may be isolated from each other but they make contact through the hub. Love and faith provide unity among the Spiritual Community.¹³² In that setting, all the qualities of love are elevated above their abuses.¹³³ But mutual love for God cannot completely unite human beings. Even in the Spiritual Community the subject-object split can't be mended or love is precluded.¹³⁴ The inevitable tension within love is always felt--the desire for separateness and the drive toward unity. It's felt in all love's qualities, protected by love's justice and power, and prompted by faith in love as the absolute, the final revelation.

Evaluation of Tillich's view of unconditional acceptance. Tillich's thorough explanation of how love is related to power and justice is a strong contribution he has made to this subject. His logic is sound and counteracts the popular views of love as sentimentalism, wishy-washiness, blind devotion, etc.

¹²⁸Tillich, "Being and Love," p. 341.

¹²⁹Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 281.

¹³⁰Tillich, "Being and Love," p. 334.

¹³¹Tillich, Systematic Theology, II, 134.

¹³²Ibid., III, 156-157.

¹³³Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice, p. 116.

¹³⁴Tillich, Systematic Theology, III, 253.

The strength of his views is also apparent when he describes love as the absolute principle: the only category or standard that transcends the subject-object split, that applies to both concrete and abstract situations, that is both absolute and relative, infinite and finite. Selecting it as the ultimate standard prevents the development of a staid rigidity because as an abstract principle it is flexible. Yet, because it is also concrete, it prevents the loss of all guidelines as it gives direction in every concrete situation.

He also makes a positive contribution to this discussion when he points out that in the Christian view of love, separation is necessary in order to have love function as the reunion of the separated. This does not mean that alienation is necessary, for his emphasis in the concept of separation is on the original and basic unity. That basic unity is what makes reunion possible. In this way recognition and allowance for differences becomes a help rather than a hindrance to acceptance.

There is one context in which he qualifies this link between love and separation. It occurs in a discussion of self love. First of all, the term itself is a misnomer, he says, because the self is never really separated from itself and thus love as reunion is impossible. Self-love is only a metaphor and the term would be better replaced by self-affirmation, self-acceptance, and selfishness.¹³⁵ That being true, God cannot love Himself either. In fact, if God is love, the expression of Himself would be the striving toward reunion with those separated from Him. And, if all were like God, or nearly so, how would he express Himself and find fulfillment? The situation is not quite as clearly

¹³⁵Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice, p. 34.

contrary as that. Tillich does say that the self can be separated from its center and reunited with it (though he still calls this metaphor).¹³⁶ And he says that God does love Himself, in a sense, because of the separation within and from Himself.¹³⁷ (Hammond says Tillich severely qualifies that by saying the lack of real separation prevents real love.)¹³⁸ But, even though thus qualified, the relationship between separation and love is still evident.

It's at this point that Hamilton objects to Tillich's view of salvation. He contends that if human beings are somewhat righteous to begin with--have essential union with their Ground--then when they are reunited by love they are reunited with what they already have and, to an extent, saved by themselves.¹³⁹ I don't see that as a serious objection. Tillich's view of the importance of God's grace to accept us in spite of what we are in our ambiguous state is adequately strong to resist accusations of that sort.

Another contribution Tillich has made is to include within the category of love both acceptance and condemnation. For him that condemnation is directed against that which would destroy love as the drive toward reunion. He develops this thought most completely in discussing God's justice as both creative and condemning. This notion appears to fit very nicely with an anti-dogmatism stance where dogmatism would be a

¹³⁶Ibid., p. 70.

¹³⁷Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 283. cf. Tillich, "Being and Love," p. 334.

¹³⁸Hammond, Man in Estrangement, p. 160.

¹³⁹Hamilton, pp. 213-214.

potentially destructive barrier preventing the acceptance of and unity with others. But might it not also speak out against a disinterested openness as well?

COMPARISON OF ROGERS AND TILlich

Central to the concern of both men is the idea of acceptance. Their views of that concept are similar in that they both see it as a deep and unconditional acceptance of another. For Rogers positive regard must be given without evaluation. For Tillich it is an experience like forgiveness, yet he avoids that word because it has the connotation of the superiority of the forgiver and the inferiority of the forgiven.¹⁴⁰ (There is a difference here between the two men: forgiveness implies wrongdoing and acceptance "in spite of." Rogers, of course, does not make any allowance for an "in spite of" acceptance that still rejects some part of the person's behavior, thoughts, looks, etc.) For both the willingness of individuals to accept themselves comes only as they perceive themselves as acceptable to another. Rogers describes the result of acceptance as bringing persons into harmony with themselves and aiding the social thrust of the being; Tillich says agape accepts others as a person then tries to reunite with them.¹⁴¹ Rogers asserts that acceptance helps create a climate in which individuals become more creative, a view with which Tillich agrees when he says that the human response to God's love is to encourage creativity.

¹⁴⁰Paul Tillich and Carl Rogers, Paul Tillich and Carl Rogers: A Dialogue (San Diego: San Diego State College, 1966), p. 11.

¹⁴¹*Ibid.*, p. 21.

Both agree that accepting others involves allowing them the freedom to express themselves. For Rogers that is being what you are. Acceptance doesn't try to coerce another. For Tillich it is the justice of love that resists whatever attempts to destroy separateness. In spite of this similarity they also have opposing views about the nature of this human freedom. Rogers would not force anyone to do what they don't want to do while for Tillich (as he describes God's love) compulsion is love's strange work. Rogers says individual freedom is inherent (and its limits are unclear) while Tillich points out that it is ambiguous and limited by destiny, participation, and form. Rogers says that in a climate of real freedom the individual tends to move toward more social behavior as well as individual growth; Tillich says that, because of the ambiguity of life, there is no one able to create that kind of freedom for another nor does he believe in the power of individuals to use their freedom as they should.¹⁴² Rogers says that we cannot judge even anti-social behavior in others and still be unconditionally accepting and true to their freedom, while Tillich believes that true love destroys what is against it and is condemning as well as forgiving.

These similarities and differences have serious theological impact. For example, they suggest similar yet divergent views of human nature. The comparison of these two men on this concept came to a personal and profound meeting in their dialogue in San Diego in 1965. It was to be Paul Tillich's final public appearance before his death later that year. These two giants of the academic world lived out in their conversation that day the principles which they had taught and written

¹⁴²Ibid., p. 6.

about for decades. Even to read the manuscript of that broadcast allows one to experience the mental sharpness, perception of ideas, and creativity of thought at their command. But, just as importantly, even the typed words on lifeless paper cannot hide the personal interaction that took place--the sensitivity to themselves, the awareness and esteem for the other's feelings, and the acceptance of their diversity as well as their similarity.

Rogers describes human nature as "incurably social" and directional, i.e. moving toward self-actualization.¹⁴³ He views human beings as trustworthy and has absolute confidence in their positive orientation. Tillich expresses his view in two parts: essential and existential. The essential nature is what has been present since creation and that nature is good. The existential nature, however, is a distortion of (not just the opposite of) the essential nature.¹⁴⁴ In the present human beings experience both their essential and existential natures and that contrast is what makes life ambiguous.

On this level it appears that both are in agreement as to some basic goodness in the human being that can be tapped and actualized. Both support a distinction between being and becoming. They feel that being is important: for Rogers to be what is is a key to growth and for Tillich being is the relationship between the polarities of becoming and rest. So being describes existence while becoming refers to the process of actualizing potentials.

But there is a rather sharp difference, for it is on the level of essence that Tillich sees this goodness. Rogers has not been as

¹⁴³Ibid., p. 4.

¹⁴⁴Ibid., p. 5.

precise as to differentiate between essence and existence, and there is some reason to suspect that there may not always have been a recognition of that distinction.¹⁴⁵ Until research indicated differently, Rogers thought that the need for love was learned, but studies to the contrary led him to agree that it was an intrinsic part of human life from its earliest moments. Tillich sees the goodness as distorted in present human experience while Rogers believes that the distortion is not a necessary part of the human condition.

This suggests their different views of sin. If Rogers were to describe "sin" perhaps he would say that it is that which prevents the experiencing and expression of the true self. It might also be the refusal to accept self and others "as is" without demands to change. It might be the incongruence brought by inculcating societal values that conflict with inner experience. For Tillich sin is a much more deep-seated problem. It is sin which causes the estrangement between that which was formerly united, between human beings and the Ground of Being, between one's own essence and existence. He does not hesitate to assert that it is a bad part of the human condition that must be repressed and destroyed.¹⁴⁶ For Rogers, "sin" would appear to be only a temporary condition while for Tillich it is part of the human dilemma.

This suggests that Tillich seems to have a more limited view of the positive thrust of human nature than Rogers. Rogers' trust in humanness is so strong that when he asserts the natural freedom of human

¹⁴⁵Suggestion by Paul Schurman, associate professor of religion and personality at the School of Theology at Claremont, personal interview, Claremont, CA, October 10, 1977.

¹⁴⁶Tillich and Rogers, pp. 9-10.

beings he also believes that their freedom will inevitably lead to positive social and personal conclusions. Tillich, however, accurately points out that freedom in the context of destiny is finitude and describes the essence of humankind as "finite freedom."¹⁴⁷ Tillich does not trust human freedom to always be used constructively enough to create the necessary intervention for self or others.

In summary, Rogers sees unconditional acceptance as a necessary part of the environment of growth. He says that acceptance must exist without conditions--apart from looks, behavior, intelligence, status, accomplishments, etc. It is to be given to both self and others without reservations. And, by the same token, individuals are not to allow others, even authority figures, to make decisions for them. They are to trust themselves and act on their freedom to be what they are. Each individual has the capacity and tendency to bring congruence.¹⁴⁸

While agreeing that acceptance is of upmost importance, Tillich is not opposed to allowing for judgment and evaluation to be part of acceptance. He asserts that the convictions on which judgment is based preserve individuality by not surrendering to authority statements, yet do this while recognizing that there is the need for controls because of the distortion of human goodness. He sees unconditional acceptance as the symbol and essence of the Divine and points to the experience of Christ on the cross as its best illustration.

¹⁴⁷Tillich, Systematic Theology, II, 31.

¹⁴⁸Rogers, "A Theory of Therapy . . .," p. 221.

Chapter 4

DOGMATISM AND UNCONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF OTHERS
THEORETICALLY COMPARED

In the previous chapter Rogers and Tillich were compared as to their views of acceptance with some mention of the theological implications of those views. Now Rokeach's concept of dogmatism needs to be brought together with Roger's and Tillich's views of acceptance.

When Rokeach talks about dogmatism being the sum total of the defense mechanisms working together¹ Rogers would agree because he has said that the defenses function to preserve the status quo and prevent creative change.² Both agree that the more insecure one is the more tenaciously he or she holds on to what is known. By using the defenses the psyche attempts to protect itself against real or perceived threat, so the more defensive one becomes the more rigid and locked in one is to already explored ideas, traditional values, and behaviors. Tillich comes close to describing this idea when he identifies the dynamics-form polarity. He sees each human being as continually being faced with the need to adapt, change, and be creative (dynamics) yet also needing to hold on to the familiar, the tried, the secure (form).

Rokeach and Rogers would agree that dogmatism is not a trait limited to right-wing conservatives. Rokeach's research substantiating that has been cited. Much of his thrust was precisely on this point for

¹Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind (New York: Basic, 1960), p. 67.

²Carl Rogers, On Becoming a Person (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961), pp. 63-64.

he wanted to move beyond the right-wing identification made by the F Scale to characterize dogmatism as a method of belief not limited to any one viewpoint or ideology. Rogers, while saying that the desire to maintain the status quo is found primarily among conservatives, does recognize that there is fear of change in everyone. When he describes the "true believer" (those who have the attitude of "our truth is the truth") he includes in that category those who are left-wing and middle ground persons as well as conservatives.³

Another way in which Rokeach and Rogers are similar is in the value they place on openmindedness or unconditional acceptance. Rokeach sees openmindedness as the solution for the defensive rejection of dogmatism. Rogers says acceptance allows individuals to lower their defenses and look more closely at that which they've been avoiding. Tillich too could agree with this notion that acceptance has healing properties as it reunites those who have become alienated.

In the theological implications of their thought there are some distinctions. Both Rokeach and Rogers have a very positive view of human nature. They see human beings as oriented toward growth and improvement for themselves and society. Tillich hesitates to paint the picture as optimistically as that. Though agreeing that human beings are essentially good, he is quick to add that in the present that goodness is distorted and neither individuals nor society can be relied on to exhibit a continual positive orientation toward themselves or others.

All three agree that the present human condition does not always illustrate this goodness. Rokeach might say that closedmindedness that

³Carl Rogers, On Personal Power (New York: Delacorte Press, 1977), p. 281.

inhibits the natural positive thrust and prevents the demonstration of that goodness. Rogers might attribute the block to the refusal to accept self or others as they are. Tillich might describe the difficulty as the estrangement between those who were once united, the alienation from the Ground of Being.

Rokeach and Rogers use almost identical language when they warn against the danger of individuals accepting the authority of others. Both suggest that those who are maturely balanced do not allow others to make decisions for them. The locus of evaluation is consciously moved to within the self. Tillich's conclusion is similar though he reaches it by a different approach. He explains that the human condition in which the polarities of individualization-participation, dynamics-form, and freedom-destiny are faced present individuals with the anxiety of non-existence. That anxiety is overcome by the actions of God and by each individual being grasped by the value of God's intervention. While God does speak and act authoritatively there is also the need for individuals to evaluate and respond to God before His authority becomes authority for them.

The similarity between their views is apparent. They all could say that openmindedness, unconditional positive regard, and love must be given without reservation. Rogers most clearly states that there must be no judgment or evaluation involved in it. The statements Rokeach makes on the subject and the premises behind his theory such as his positive view of human nature and his confidence in its constructive thrust would probably lead him to agree. Tillich, however, says love does not exist without power and justice, i.e. compulsion and condemnation are part of love. Love without those characteristics is only chaotic surrender.

THESIS

Could not these varying views be brought together? Are there not ways in which they could contribute to each other both with their similar and dissimilar compliments? Is there not some way in which one could maintain firm convictions and still be open toward others? accepting and still condemning of offending behavior? closedminded about ideas and openminded about people? or openminded about being closedminded?! Are dogmatism and unconditional acceptance mutually exclusive? In theory, are they directly related to each other, indirectly related, or independent of each other?

Rokeach and Rogers seem to indicate that the two are destructive of each other. They both assert that as the level of closedmindedness grows the level of openmindedness or unconditional positive regard decreases.

The studies pointing toward problems with linking the two as opposites have been documented in the evaluation section of Chapter 2. Those empirical studies have suggested that the link between the two may not have been as strong as it was thought and, in some cases, there was no link at all. Theoretically, Vande Loo very adequately underscored the potential result of an unconditional acceptance that lays aside all personal convictions. It may produce only an impersonal, unattached, disoriented, and certainly unsatisfactory acceptance. It would appear more like apathy than regard. Rollo May has made a good case for seeing apathy (rather than hate, as is often assumed) as the opposite of love.⁴

⁴Rollo May, Love and Will (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 29.

These studies and ideas suggest that confrontation with another may not mean rejection. Condemnation doesn't necessarily mean hate but may, in fact, indicate the esteem in which the other is held, the strong desire to improve that relationship. Might it be that both unconditional acceptance and dogma-dogmatism could exist together? That possibility would hinge on making a distinction between the firm convictions (on the theoretical level) that lead to condemnation and rejection (on the attitude level) and the firm convictions (on the theoretical level) that lead to confrontation (on the attitude level).

So the dilemma faced by those who set up an opposite relationship between unconditional acceptance and dogmatism is that acceptance can become meaningless without the contraposition of another idea or person.

But there is also a dilemma faced by those who have tried to hold the two together as compliments. Their problem comes to light when the opposing position or person takes on the claim of being exclusive, as having truth not just for the individual holding it but for everyone. When that becomes the case, they have been faced with either giving up the claim to universality so that acceptance can still be given unconditionally, or giving up the hope of acceptance being unconditional. In the end they have found no way to keep one or the other from "winning" and destroying the essence of its opponent. This, for example, is the result of Cook's inquiry.

The destructive power of dogmatism as described by Rokeach is certainly evident. And the constructive potential or unconditional acceptance Rogers has advocated is clearly effective. But both might be strengthened if the place of strong beliefs and firm convictions were

more apparent. These men's advocacy and articulate promotion of their own ideas and studies gives evidence that they themselves have strong convictions. Those convictions add sincerity and direction to their lives and work.. They may even partially explain why others have responded to their leadership. Yet their theory advocates an openness that demonstrates that even in their own work the tension is there though they have not dealt with it thoroughly in any published works to date.

The problem now faced is to see if it is possible for unconditional acceptance to include dogma (firm convictions) without leading to dogmatism (defensive rejection). Stated another way, is it possible for dogma to retain any claims to its universal truth without losing the unconditional aspect of acceptance? Can unconditional acceptance allow the participation of dogmatic beliefs without destroying them and becoming chaotic surrender? And can dogmatic convictions allow the presence of unconditional acceptance without eliminating it and becoming legalistic?

Paul Tillich seems to suggest some ways in which a possible solution might be found. By that I do not mean that this was an issue that received his direct attention. But he does suggest some concepts that are applicable to these questions and may point in the direction of a potential resolution of the existing dilemmas. His ideas will not simply be reintroduced here, but will be rearranged and used as a springboard for the introduction of suggestions that might approach the central thesis of this chapter, that dogma and unconditional acceptance are not opposites.

LOVE AS ACCEPTANCE AND JUDGMENT

When he speaks of love as including both acceptance and judgment, he is affirming several important concepts. He is agreeing with Rokeach and Rogers when they stress that in order to be effective acceptance must be given without reservation. Should the others detect hesitancy or rejection of parts of themselves they may try to cover up those and similar traits in the future to avoid that negative evaluation. Thus conditional acceptance would seem to lead to such defensive behaviors as denial, projection, introjection, avoidance, etc.

But he is also avoiding the hazard of acceptance becoming an uninvolved acquiescence to everything and everyone. By introducing the concept of judgment as part of love he is wanting to maintain the intensity of commitment that firm convictions offer.

Love as Openness

Implied in the notion of love as openness is the recognition of and preservation of the separateness of each individual. As we saw in the previous chapter, Tillich's view of love requires this distinctness in order for there to be any possibility of reunion. God's love toward us is marked by His respect for and encouragement of our uniqueness and freedom to express it. There needs to be that recognition in human relationships too.

This suggests that individuals have a responsibility not to trample over the uniqueness and freedom of another. Unconditional acceptance is a very forceful way of preventing that from happening. It places no requirements on the one to be accepted but leaves them free to be who they are. It prevents the molding of one individual into the

image of another, the limitations of which are illustrated in Lewis Chamberlain's poem about Martin Luther.

MARTIN LUTHER⁵

If a really
Good man
Could have
Gotten hold of
Him
And chopped
Off
His highs
And filled in
His lows
And taught
Him to function
Within the
Framework
Of things
As they are
Luther might
Have grown up
Capable
Of managing
His father's
Foundry.

There is another side to the issue of responsibility for maintaining the freedom and separateness of others that must be mentioned. That is the occasional need to exert control in order to preserve that freedom for another. Perhaps this can be illustrated in the case of children. The 1970 White House Conference on Children stirred up considerable interest in this area. Since then several excellent books have appeared on the subject of children's rights. Though many have focused on the right of children to be liberated from oppressive parents and an adult society thus sounding quite libertarian, others have called attention to the need to protect children from losing their separateness not

⁵Lewis Chamberlain, "Martin Luther," Christianity Today, XIV:15 (April 24, 1970), 4.

by oppression but by enticement. They point out that there is a built-in problem in society which needs to be overcome, i.e. children are programmed by the advertising industry to want that which is not inherently attractive or essential. They assert that there are rewards and punishments within freedom that would help the child eventually make wise choices⁶ and that restrictions need to be imposed when the freedom of others is affected.⁷ The issue is clearly drawn by Arthur when he says:

Should children be as equal as people? Certainly not. They should not have equal liberty: They should have less. Neither should they have equal protection--they should have more. How much more and how much less will depend on the maturity of the particular child at the particular time.⁸

As openness affirms the unique value of each individual, it brings several positive results. The confidence of self-esteem is one. Rollo May says that real love can only function in a climate of strength, a strength which is the result of this confident self-image. Confidence allows one to give without the threat of loss becoming jealousy.⁹

That confidence also makes the individual willing to experiment and be creative. It provides the security to make them willing to let go of what they have and reach toward something new. Frank Kimper outlines the relationship between initiative, creativity, and security very nicely according to the following scheme. Frustrated initiative would

⁶Richard Farson, Birthrights (New York: Macmillan, 1974), p. 38.

⁷A. S. Neill, "Freedom Works," in his Children's Rights (New York: Praeger, 1971), p. 140.

⁸G. Lindsay Arthur, "Should Children Be as Equal as People?" in Albert E. Wilkerson (ed.) The Rights of Children (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1973), p. 137.

⁹Rollo May, "Love, Jealousy and Power," McCalls, C:2 (November 1972), 126.

produce anger and the impulse to annihilate the cause of frustration. This impulse to annihilate brings the fear of rejection by others. Memory serves to organize responses to the present around past painful experiences and the anticipation of future similar ones. The potential reward of self-affirmation as uniquely precious is avoided because of the catastrophic expectations of rejection and individuals settle for "poor praise." A sense of false security is found in holding on to the status quo and avoiding the new and creative. He says the "fear hidden in anxiety is the fear of one's own POWER--the power to alienate, identify, destroy, make changes."¹⁰ So in an accepting relationship, true security creates an environment in which creativity can grow. John Cobb and Daniel Day Williams agree that in relationship each individual must constantly change so each is giving up the security of the known for an unknown good.¹¹

It is often assumed that when individuals are uncertain they become defensive to cover up their insecurity. Defensiveness has usually been identified with a dogmatic and closed stance toward others. But might it not also appear among the apparently openminded in the search for confidence and security? In that case openness would actually be masking confluence in an attempt to avoid conflict and find support. By the same token, the confidence of a dogmatic system may not always indicate defensiveness but may originate in genuine self-assurance.

¹⁰Frank W. Kimper, "Gleanings from Gestalt Therapy" (School of Theology at Claremont, [n.d.]), p. 4. (Mimeographed.)

¹¹John B. Cobb, Jr. "A Process Systematic Theology," Journal of Religion, L:2 (April 1970), 202.

Love as "In Spite Of" Acceptance

According to Tillich, acceptance does not overlook differences but is given in spite of them. This is a statement even more radical than the assertion that acceptance must be given without reservations. In this case reservations are very present, values are not relinquished, firm convictions bring the dilemma of acceptance or rejection directly to focus. Yet, in the face of even offensive differences acceptance is given. The differences are acknowledged but the individual is accepted in spite of them.

Oden makes the same point when he says that the Judeo-Christian message is "I'm OK, You're OK." God, he continues, is the source of our OKness and we see through Biblical events that in spite of our mistakes and weaknesses we are accepted and acceptable.¹²

The danger of the "in spite of" part of love does not present itself in the Divine-human relationship as it does on the human level. The phrase itself implies forgiveness and, as Tillich has correctly shown, forgiveness implies a one-up one-down relationship.¹³ That sort of inequality may accurately describe the Divine and the human, but that sort of distinction on the human level immediately threatens the unconditional part of acceptance. If the other is only accepted on a lower level than oneself, has not a conditional aspect been introduced to acceptance? Thus equality is an essential feature of unconditional acceptance.

¹²Thomas C. Oden, "Who Says You're OK?" Faith/At/Work, LXXXVII:5 (August 1974), 8.

¹³Paul Tillich and Carl Rogers, Paul Tillich and Carl Rogers: A Dialogue (San Diego: San Diego State College, 1966), p. 11.

God avoids this dilemma by accepting human beings as the Christ and thus an equal as well as the Ground of Being and thus a superior. For human beings to evade that problem another solution must be sought by which they can acknowledge and "forgive" offensive differences without suggesting the superiority of the forgiver and the inferiority of the forgiven. The next section will include an exploration of this question.

Love as Condemnation

Love as in spite of acceptance infers the potential of love condemning as well as simply acknowledging differences. Tillich describes part of love in these terms. His statements refer to love's condemnation of that which would destroy it. This would certainly include those negative parts of dogmatism that tend to destroy relationships such as bigotry, defensiveness, closedmindedness, etc.

But might it not also condemn the potential negativeness of unconditional acceptance that becomes impersonal and disinterested? That too precludes the intimate reunion of the separated. And the condemnation of these unsatisfactory expressions of acceptance as well as dogmatism would lend additional strength to the view that the two categories are not opposites. At the extreme both inhibit meaningful relationships.

But the question remains, how can human beings accept one another in spite of their differences and still maintain equality with each other? When Tillich describes the difference between essence and existence their essence is distorted. Since both the essential goodness and existential distortion are experienced in life, the state of human being is ambiguous.

Would it be going too far to take these basic premises, look at them in the context of love as acceptance and judgment, and see what conclusions might be formed?

First, a difference is noted between what one is and what one does, says, and thinks. This distinction most closely fits Roberto Assagioli's psychological description of disidentification in which he suggests the value of separating identity from body, mind, emotions, desires, etc. The exercises he outlines to aid in that disidentification conclude with this statement of identification:

At the disidentification of myself, the "I," from the contents of consciousness, such as sensations, emotions, thoughts, I recognize and affirm that I am a center of pure self-consciousness. I am a center of will, capable of observing, directing and using all my psychological processes and my physical body.¹⁴

If the essential qualities of the human being were to become the ground of equality and acceptance, and the distorted expressions of that essence were to become the focus of condemnation and judgment, what would be the result? Acceptance would be based on capacity and potential not achievement. It would exist before and apart from any behaviors which may or may not reflect an unadulterated picture of human essence. It would answer Jeffrey Sobosan's objection that to say God loves unconditionally is to say He loves the concrete, both good and evil,¹⁵ by seeing God's love apart from the goodness or badness of the concrete.

If the basis for acceptance were human essence not the expressions of it, unconditional acceptance could become a reinforcement of the

¹⁴Roberto Assagioli, The Act of Will (New York: Viking Press, 1973), p. 215.

¹⁵Jeffrey G. Sobosan, "Suffering, Innocence and Love," Christian Century, LCI:14 (April 10, 1974), 398.

unique preciousness of each individual and encourage the positive release of initiative, creativity, and self-worth. The occasion for this acceptance would not be a body, intelligence, talents, appearance, performance, or products. If those were the basis persons with unhealthy, unshapely bodies, diseased or undeveloped minds, mediocre opportunities and success would get little or none. These externals would determine only the method of relating while acceptance would be the attitude in which that relationship takes place.¹⁶

Judgment, condemnation, and confrontation would be based on these external expressions of essence. It could evaluate according to personal conviction and confront another with that judgment. Thus dogma would be retained and used as a criteria for evaluation and confrontation. But it would not have to conflict with unconditional acceptance for the two would relate to different levels or parts of the human being.

What is being suggested here is that individuals might be able to reject thoughts, words, or behaviors of others and still accept the persons who express those things. A person ought to be able to maintain a dogmatic system without participating in what Rokeach called opinionated acceptance and rejection. Acceptance would be given because of the essentially good essence each is and not because the other shares similar ideas, attitudes, or behaviors. In this context, the presence of evaluation would not turn dogma into rejecting, distorted dogmatism. The condemnation involved is only of distorted expressions of essence and not of the person behind those expressions.

¹⁶Frank W. Kimper, "A Meditation" (School of Theology at Claremont, [n.d.]). (Mimeographed.)

Love as condemnation does not just confront, however, but includes the desire to influence the other. It's what May calls "will" without which, he says, love is only experimental and sentimental.¹⁷ It expresses a request to participate in the experience of another, a reaching out to increase the union between two individuals. This dimension of judgment reinforces the importance of dogma and unconditional acceptance being part of the same phenomenon.

Sequentially acceptance must precede judgment, however, or a distortion of both may result. If judgment is offered first in a relationship, it may prompt premature compliance under the assumption (or reality) that acceptance is contingent on the correction of what has been judged. Thus acceptance becomes conditional and dogma becomes dogmatism in a rejecting sense. But if judgment is offered in an existing climate of support and acceptance, it becomes a method of improving an already existing relationship.

In another context but applicable here is the challenge as seen by Tillich:

There is, however, one danger in apologetics; the common ground may be overemphasized at the expense of the differences. Then you merely accept the other as he is, without giving him anything different. A way must be found between the two extremes of either throwing indigestible material at the other from an external position, or telling him what he already knows. The latter is the way liberal theology has often acted, while the former is the way of fundamentalism and orthodoxy.¹⁸

¹⁷May, Love and Will, p. 9.

¹⁸Paul Tillich, A History of Christian Thought (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968), p. 27.

And, as Myron Madden maintains, "The word of Scripture needs to be represented in a person who takes godly initiative to speak the deep word of forgiveness and acceptance."¹⁹

Love as the Absolute

When judgment and evaluation are allowed, however, questions are immediately raised. Who is fit to be the judge? What is the standard of evaluation to be? Who is to determine what the goals are and how they are to be reached? Doesn't the concept of uniqueness require that each individual be treated as such? And doesn't the emphasis on personal freedom preclude any universal standard?

Tillich's establishment of love as the absolute has been outlined in the previous chapter and will not be repeated here. The flow of his arguments provides an adequate response to questions like these. Love is the absolute because it is both flexible as abstract and directive as concrete.

He spends a considerable amount of time discussing the dangers of elevating preliminary concerns to the level of ultimacy. Perhaps this notion might help explain the origins of dogmatism. Concrete concepts cannot be absolute because they do not fit every situation. If there were any awareness that dogmatic (not in a perjorative sense) beliefs were not or might not be universally applicable, a perplexing emotional dilemma would result. The conflict between what one believed and reality would seem to require either a non-exclusive claim for the beliefs or a defensive posture to protect their unwarranted claims. In

¹⁹Myron C. Madden, The Power to Bless (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1970), p. 8.

that way the rejecting, defensive nature of dogmatism might be accounted for.

Dogmatism would then be the result of attempting to elevate a finite truth to infinite level. To avoid that there would need to be a clear distinction between "truth for me" and "truth for all." Convictions included in dogma would need to be clearly identified in one of those two categories. Any confusion of the boundary between them would lead to dogmatism.

Another dynamic suggested by this possibility is the tendency of dogmatism to try to destroy the opposition. Defensive mechanisms operate to protect self, but often do so through attacks of one sort or another on the source of threat. Again the radical nature of love as acceptance and judgment is seen as it does not defensively react to that which would destroy it. Love as the absolute is best evidenced in the cross, says Tillich, where rather than reject the opposition Christ accepted it. His confidence in the ultimacy of love was so strong that He overcame its opposition by letting it destroy Him. The symbol of the cross becomes the way to overcome the existential anxieties because in that symbol Jesus overcomes each anxiety by accepting it completely. He overcomes meaninglessness by taking part in a symbol that has no meaning unless one is grasped by it. He overcomes guilt and condemnation by accepting guilt and letting it destroy Him. And He overcomes death by accepting death as final destruction. In this way the cross becomes the example of how healing is available to estranged humankind.

Relating that idea to this study, it would infer that a dogmatism that is defensive leads to rejection but a dogma that is confident makes condemnation and acceptance possible. But is it realistic for us

to hope to find that kind of confident dogma among human beings? Is it possible for us in our ambiguous state to maintain the distinction between the absolute and the finite? Is it probably that we will be able to satisfy Christ's charge to love others as He has loved us? That would only be possible as the distinction was maintained between finite and infinite truth. And the feasibility of that is strongly influenced by the relationship of the individual to authority.

Love and Authority

As was mentioned earlier, one of the positive results of unconditional acceptance is the self-confidence it encourages. Those in whom self-confidence is lacking are the ones most likely to respond to the confrontation that is part of love by quickly conforming in an attempt to earn acceptance by good behavior. It would seem to be a short step for these insecure ones to accept the pronouncements of those from whom they most badly want affirmation as authoritative for themselves and others, and even to do so with little or no personal reflection.

Authority and authority figures suggest demands to conform. They bring images of dictators, military commanders, assembly lines with one or a small group deciding what the pattern will be then shaping everyone else to look just like that. On the surface it sounds like authority would destroy the unique value and freedom that unconditional acceptance affirms.

That problem becomes more complex in our setting for, as Scobie has pointed out, acceptance of authority is an integral part of religious

faith. So doing a study among religiously oriented persons and ideas is bound to include that influence.²⁰

Some of Tillich's ideas already mentioned help balance the view that authority limits or destroys uniqueness and freedom. There is justice whose task it is to maintain the separateness between individuals. And it must be remembered that uniqueness is not based on what persons do or say or think. These are only expressions of the uniqueness that is part of their personhood. They are unique in their essence in that they are each an individual creation different from every other one. Yet in that foundation of uniqueness they are also similar to every other since they are all creatures. So Nelson correctly explains the resultant situation by illustrating how the distortion of individuality is atomization of "my total freedom" while the distortion of participation is collective oppression or "my total freedom plus force."²¹

Gestaltists describe the self as aware, creative, discovering, inventive, and free to choose among the options of the novel moment.²² Fritz Peris himself thinks that individual growth is inhibited by external authority and control. In the Gestalt Prayer he says,

. . . I am not in this world to live up to your expectations.
You are not in this world to live up to mine. I am I and you are
you. . . .

Elsewhere he elaborates on that idea and asserts that every control

²⁰Geoffrey E. W. Scoble, Psychology of Religion (New York: Wiley, 1975), p. 117.

²¹John Wiley Nelson, "An Inquiry into the Methodological Structure of Paul Tillich's Systematic Theology," Encounter, XXXV (Summer 1974), 171-183.

²²Class lecture by Frank W. Kimper, professor of theology and personality, Claremont, October 3, 1973.

places on the organism interferes with its proper functioning. Even if the control is internalized, it is a hindrance.²³

He underscores an important point when describing the damaging potential of external control. But his analogy of swallowing food whole has some important implications. It is true that internalizing external demands and expectations, like swallowing food without chewing it, produces indigestion and the instinct to throw up. But if those expectations were thoroughly investigated, evaluated, and a personal decision made about them would they still be harmful? In that case would they not cease to be foreign to the system but become an integral part of it (by digestion, to continue his analogy)?

If that were done, security may result as individuals gained confidence in their ability to think through the requests of authorities and come to personal decisions about them. They would not be manipulated by their own needs for acceptance and settle for the conditional acceptance of conformity. Nor would they be threatened by the presumed power of another to affirm or reject their freedom but would recognize that no one else can give them freedom nor allow them to be free. They are by nature free and their choice would be an affirmation of that reality.²⁴

Thus in the ideal authority would come to be a directive rather than a manipulative or controlling force. I say in the ideal because it is evident that the human condition would certainly make that difficult.

²³Frederick S. Peris, Gestalt Therapy Verbatim (Moab, UT: Real People Press, 1969), p. 19.

²⁴Erving Polster and Miriam Polster, Gestalt Therapy Integrated (New York: Brunner/Mazel, 1973), p. 103.

Because of the distortions of essential goodness, human authorities do tend to express themselves as controlling, manipulative, demanding, and conditionally accepting of those who disagree with them. And even in the Divine-human relationship, if we are to assume the authority of God as ideal, we are still confronted with the ambiguous human condition that tends to try to earn acceptance rather than accept it as unconditional, and that often misuses uniqueness and freedom. But these concerns are more related to the focus of the following chapter that deals with the functional relationship of the two categories than this theoretical section.

Love and Human Response

The importance of the individual's relation to authority brings up the subject of love as acceptance and judgment and human response. Tillich's views provide an orientation again. He says the power of the Christ event becomes effective for those who are grasped by it. Faith is the state of being grasped by the transcendent unity making it our link with the Divine.

This suggests that the response indicated in love is being grasped by it or, to use other terms, to acknowledge and accept it. Unless love as either acceptance or condemnation or both is conceded it is useless. This acceptance must be more than just a mental acknowledgment that it was heard and understood. It must be accepted as truth.

This mental and emotional assent precedes any behavioral response. Unity comes by "faith" and not as the result of any correction of offensive ideas or behavior. The importance of acceptance preceding judgment is again highlighted, as is the necessity of judgment being part

of love and not a separate entity. If judgment were preliminary to and separate from acceptance and love, unity could be the result of corrected differences. But because both are part of the same process and when acceptance precedes judgment, the unity that results is based on faith and confidence rather than works.

There is a place for works, however, even in Tillich's view. For him faith is the bridge between love and works. Love, he says, is always acted out in works but works without faith are hypocritical attempts at unity. So faith (which is ultimate concern) and love (which is the drive toward unity) work together as the drive toward unity with the ultimate concern (which is love).

Another type of response called for by love is intimated here. It has already been mentioned that there is a sense in which individuals have responsibility to preserve the freedom and uniqueness of others. That idea is reinforced in this context by Fromm's assertion that "To love productively . . . implies labor and care and responsibility for its (love's) growth."²⁵ Once another is unconditionally accepted there is no way to detach that one from the arena of concern. An active acceptance includes involvement. And that involvement may mean confrontation and condemnation also. The circle widens as love in a dyad finds fulfillment and leads to shared love for a third.²⁶

²⁵Erich Fromm, Man for Himself (New York: Rinehart, 1947), p. 98.

²⁶Ewert Cousins, "A Theology of Interpersonal Relations," Thought, XLV:176 (Spring 1970), 60, 61.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Evidence has tended to indicate that dogmatism without unconditional acceptance becomes capricious, rigid, and rejecting. It restricts the expression of the positive qualities of human nature and inhibits relationships. Studies also show that unconditional acceptance without dogmatism becomes blind surrender, easy grace, impersonal, and meaningless.

The two categories have usually been seen as opposites, and it has been suggested that as the level of one increases the level of the other decreases.

The thesis of this study has been that to describe either in isolation from the other results in a distorted understanding of both and of their relationship. An effort has been made to combine the positive aspects of dogma (such as security, confidence, self-assurance) with the positive contributions of unconditional acceptance (such as openmindedness, high self-esteem, creativity, and spontaneity).

The difficulty of that task is illustrated by past studies of this type in which a dilemma is faced: either dogma becomes so distorted that it becomes dogmatism and destroys the unconditional aspect of acceptance, or unconditional acceptance takes over dogmatic convictions leaving it valueless and impersonal.

The category of love as both acceptance and judgment is suggested as a way in which Tillich may have pointed toward an answer to the dilemma. Love in that sense includes a recognition and affirmation of the unique value of each individual. It includes those things Berger calls other acceptance like the lack of rejection of others, refusal to dominate others, assume responsibility for them, deny their equal worth. It

shows a desire to serve others, takes an active interest in others, and, while advancing self, doesn't infringe on others.²⁷ It includes what Fromm defines as love such as the capacity for the experience of concern, responsibility, respect, and understanding of another and the intense desire for that other's growth.²⁸

But it does not gloss over imperfections or existing and perhaps offensive differences. It includes the concepts of condemnation and power elaborated on by Tillich and May. It is acceptance in spite of contrary convictions, behaviors, etc.

It implies the idea of forgiveness yet avoids the inequality forgiveness connotes by making a distinction between essence and expressions of that essence. Acceptance is given on the basis of essence in which all human beings are equal while judgment is made at the level of expression in which all human beings differ. Expressions of human essence are always distorted and confrontation and condemnation in the positive sense are efforts to overcome the barriers those distortions erect between persons.

The forgiving and condemning aspects of love are offered not to overlook sin but to correct it. Repentance and reformation are the objectives intended. God wants to meet humanity in both healing and restoration.²⁹ Unconditional acceptance is offered without limitations,

²⁷Emanuel M. Berger, "The Relation Between Expressed Acceptance of Self and Expressed Acceptance of Others," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, XLVII:4 (October 1952), 779.

²⁸Erich Fromm, Psychoanalysis and Religion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 86.

²⁹Edward E. Thornton, Theology and Pastoral Counseling (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 32.

but in the context of distorted human goodness. Condemnation brings an awareness of inadequacy, and it is only then that forgiveness occurs.³⁰ Without judgment illuminating the negative and unacceptable expressions of human nature acceptance in spite of weakness and error would never be experienced.

Love is presented as the only absolute and the necessity of making sure all other convictions and beliefs that are part of dogma be recognized as "truth for me" is emphasized. Without this distinction finite concepts may be held as ultimate truths thus leading from dogma to dogmatism.

The relevance of authority as a directive rather than a controlling or manipulating force is stated. The tendency of insecure persons to rely on authoritative pronouncements as having universal application is counteracted by each individual asserting their personal freedom in screening analyzing those pronouncements before accepting them.

The importance of human response to love is mentioned. The response advocated is one of faith rather than behavior. Faith is described as the acknowledgment and acceptance--mentally and emotionally--of the acceptance and condemnation of love. It prevents persons from relying on conforming to bring unity and turns them toward the Christ event as the ultimate symbol of love as the drive toward reunion.

According to this scheme, dogma would be an expression of self-confidence, of the assurance necessary to try new ideas and methods, of that which defines the limits of individual freedom, and of the need to

³⁰Oden, p. 9.

preserve enough of the status quo to maintain meaningful relationships. It would provide an unchanging hope and point of reference.³¹

Unconditional acceptance would be seen as an expression of being what is, of a lack of inhibition and a manifestation of spontaneity, of allowing others to be what they are. While dogma would be being confident of one's status, acceptance would be being one's status. Both connote a willingness to be what is without needing to fight against it, deny it, defensively protect it, or be ashamed of it.

Love as acceptance and judgment includes a recognition of the unique value of each individual and a willingness to disidentify that value from externals and identify it with the essence of all human beings, a desire to preserve personal freedom at all costs including condemning polluted expressions of human essence, a will to share and experience acceptance before condemnation, and a commitment to the other that requires deep personal involvement.

This kind of love as dogma still allows for unconditional acceptance because the dogmatic (in a non-pejorative sense) condemnation has nothing to do with the essence of the other. And, by the same token, love as unconditional acceptance does not eliminate the possibility of dogma because it is not concerned with the external expressions of essential goodness.

This position does not remove all the hazards in dogmatism and unconditional acceptance. But if the balance between them is maintained it does suggest a viable alternative to picturing them as opposites.

³¹James Montague Cook, Grace and Dogmatism in the Theology of Nels F. S. Ferre (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1975), p. 222.

When both are kept in mind the finitude and unlimited potential of human beings is recognized. When both are combined persons are able to confront the parts of themselves and others they want to change and still be affirming and maintain self-worth. When the two exist together sin is both condemned and forgiven. When both work together persons are challenged by their weaknesses and encouraged by their strengths. As Howard Clinebell says,

Acceptance without honest confrontation is experienced as incomplete acceptance. Confrontation without caring and acceptance is experienced as judgmentalism and rejection. A relationship stimulates growth when persons can 'speak the truth in love' (Eph. 4:15 NEB), as the New Testament describes the growth formula.³²

³¹Howard J. Clinebell, Jr., Growth Counseling for Marriage Enrichment (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975), p. 11.

Chapter 5

DOGMATISM AND UNCONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF OTHERS
EMPIRICALLY COMPARED

The concepts of dogma, dogmatism, and unconditional acceptance have been presented and their relationship compared theoretically. The conclusion of that theoretical comparison was that the two concepts need not be mutually exclusive but may function as part of the same phenomenon.

This chapter is devoted to an empirical comparison of the two categories. This sort of investigation could be done in several ways: by observing behavior, by having behavior reported by the Subjects, by attitude impressions reported by others, and by attitude surveys of the Subjects themselves to name a few. In this case the last alternative was selected.

That choice was not made without recognizing the limitations inherent in such a survey. Legitimate questions can be asked as to the accuracy of the Subjects' evaluation of themselves, of their honesty in self disclosure, and of whether these surveys really measure what they claim. To avoid as many of those difficulties as possible, two well-established instruments were used. Their reliability and validity has been repeatedly authenticated and they are presently among the standard measures for these attitudes. They are Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale Form E and Berger's Expressed Acceptance of Self and Expressed Acceptance of Others scale.¹

¹Rokeach's scale is included in The Open and Closed Mind. Berger's scale was obtained directly from him at the University of Minnesota, Student Counseling Bureau, 101 Eddy Hall, Minneapolis, MN 55455.

Before the methodology and data of that study are reported perhaps a brief exploration of anticipated results would be in order. What relationship between the two categories at the attitude level do the various theories imply?

Rokeach and Rogers say the two are opposites. That would suggest that as the level of one increases the other decreases. To be total opposites a correlation coefficient of -1 would be sought.

Following the direction indicated by Tillich and the thesis of this study two possibilities are immediately apparent. The first would be that there would be no relationship at all since even theoretically there is only an indirect relationship as they are both part of love. But functionally there might be no relationship because they operate at different levels. In this case a correlation coefficient of 0 would be predicted.

The second possibility is suggested in Tillich's notion that in the face of increased separation and estrangement the power of love to overcome that difference must be greater. This might predict that as the degree of difference or dogmatism grows the intensity of acceptance would grow too. In this case a positive correlation coefficient would be anticipated.

Yet the predictions based on the thesis of this study are not that simple. Because of the difficulties in transferring ideal theory into human experience it is more probable that those predictions based on study rising primarily from the observation and analysis of human behavior (i.e. the ideas of Rokeach and Rogers) would more accurately describe the functional relationship of these two categories than those

predictions founded to a greater degree on philosophical and metaphysical thought.

Also it must be recognized that the distinction between dogma and dogmatism is not made on the Dogmatism Scale so it may be that the results would be colored with that ambiguity too.

METHODOLOGY

Sample

In order to continue the same type of group studied by Williams and Kremer, the study was done among pastoral counseling students. Williams' categories existed to a higher level among pastoral counseling students than among secular counseling students. The two tied to each other?

In addition to the investigation begun by them, this group was chosen for their theological and psychological orientation. All were students in the Ph.D. program in Theology and Personality with major emphasis in Personality and Counseling at the School of Theology at Claremont. The thesis is based on principles that would be most meaningful to those in one or the other of those disciplines. It is most likely that if anyone was putting that theory to work it would be some among those two groups. The students tested were uniquely part of both. All were graduates of a regular three-year seminary program, had pastoral experience, and were now extending their education to the speciality of counseling.

predictions founded to a greater degree on philosophical and metaphysical thought.

Also it must be recognized that the distinction between dogma and dogmatism is not made on the Dogmatism Scale so it may be that the results would be colored with that ambiguity too.

METHODOLOGY

Sample

In order to continue with the same type of group studied by Williams and Kremer this research was also done among pastoral counseling students. Williams and Kremer found that both categories existed to a higher level among pastoral counseling students than among secular counseling students. The next question is, are the two tied to each other?

In addition to wanting to continue the investigation begun by them, this group was chosen because of their theological and psychological orientation. All were students in the Ph.D. program in Theology and Personality with major emphasis in Personality and Counseling at the School of Theology at Claremont. The thesis is based on principles that would be most meaningful to those in one or the other of those disciplines. It is most likely that if anyone was putting that theory to work it would be some among those two groups. The students tested were uniquely part of both. All were graduates of a regular three-year seminary program, had pastoral experience, and were now extending their education to the speciality of counseling.

Twenty-six students were enrolled in the program, some away from the campus doing dissertation research. In order to avoid an inconsistent testing method by administering some in person and mailing others, the instruments were mailed to everyone. The two were stapled together with their standard instructions at the beginning of each. (The names of the scales were not included, of course.) A simple cover letter stating that the enclosed questionnaires were part of my dissertation research and were to be filled out anonymously was included along with a stamped and addressed return envelope. The only personal data requested was their age, sex, denominational affiliation and number of years in school. Two months later a reminder letter was sent but no additional instruments were returned as a result. (One instrument was returned as undeliverable.)

Fifteen were returned and became the sample analyzed. The sample was composed of twelve men and three women. Ages ranged from 27 to 44 with a mean age of 33 and a standard deviation of 4.6. They represented the nine denominations listed in Table 2. This group provides a wide spread of theological backgrounds, a variety of ages, and representation of both sexes.

Instruments and Procedure

Rokeach's Scale of Dogmatism Form E was the basis for determining the level of dogmatism because of its improvement over the right-wing bias of the California F, because its reliability and validity have been repeatedly verified, and because of the emphasis on his theory in this study.

Table 2
Denomination of Respondents

<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Denomination</u>
1	A.G.
1	American Baptist
2	Church of the Brethren
1	Lutheran
1	Mennonite
2	Roman Catholic
1	United Church of Christ
5	United Methodist
1	United Presbyterian

Berger's test evaluating the Expressed Acceptance of Self and Expressed Acceptance of Others was used to determine the level of other acceptance. It was preferred over those used by Williams and Kremer because it was not limited to the context of counseling, and its reliability and validity are established.²

For both scales, the raw scores were converted to percentages of the total possible score in order for them to be compared. Then the percentages of each Respondent were paired and a correlation analysis was done.

ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

The dogmatism scores of the sample are represented below in Table 3 in percentage figures. All are rounded off to the nearest tenth.

²His scales are actually combined as one and are administered as one set of sixty-four questions. In scoring them a correlation analysis was run on the test as a whole and the items pertaining to acceptance of others only. There was a positive correlation coefficient of 0.78853 which was significant at the .01 level. Thus there appear to be no difficulties with this sample in isolating the acceptance of others category.

Higher scores represented higher dogmatism levels, lower scores represented lower dogmatism levels.

Table 3
Level of Dogmatism

Number of observations	15
Mean	43.8
Variance	79.9
Standard deviation	8.9
Minimum	23.6
Maximum	56.4

The number of observations, though not large, was quite consistent as can be seen in the relatively small standard deviation and variance. The spread between the minimum and maximum scores is not high considering that scores from 1% to 100% were theoretically possible. These factors imply that the sample should tend to be accurate for the population it represents--a probability to be examined in connection with the comparison between dogmatism and acceptance of others.

The acceptance of others scores of the sample, again in percentage figures of the highest possible score, are presented in Table 4. Higher scores indicate that more accepting-of-others statements were made by the Respondent while lower scores indicate that fewer accepting-of-others statements were made. All figures are rounded off to the nearest tenth.

Here the consistency among the Respondents is even more marked than with the dogmatism scores. The spread between the minimum and maximum scores is less as are the resulting standard deviation and variance. These factors again point up the potential of a highly significant representation of the population they are to typify.

One possible explanation of this consistency in both cases may be the background and training of these students. It may provide similar views of confidence, authority, values, and other issues related to dogmatism. It may also give similar emphasis to openness, grace, uniqueness, freedom, and other issues related to acceptance. It certainly seems to reemphasize Rokeach's contention that conservatism and liberalism have little to do with dogmatism level, for the denominations represented by the Respondents include all portions of that spectrum yet the dogmatism levels do not seem to reflect that breadth.

Table 4
Level of Expressed Acceptance of Others

Number of Observations	15
Mean	79.5
Variance	32.0
Standard deviation	5.7
Minimum	65.0
Maximum	89.3

Another potential explanation may be that these students, like Foulds suggests about those in his study,³ had learned what they should say and feel as part of their training. And it is known that counseling students' level of dogmatism decreases during the first few months of training⁴ as does the level of those reporting additional years of

³Melvin L. Foulds, "Dogmatism and the Ability to Communicate Facilitative Conditions During Counseling," Counselor Education and Supervision, XI:2 (December 1971), 110-114.

⁴Joseph Gary Petty, "Predicting Counselor Trainee Success," Dissertation Abstracts, XXXI:7 (January 1971), 4318B.

counseling teaching experience.⁵ Any one of these could in itself account for the consistency and with all being possible the tendency is not surprising.

The heart of the issue comes to view with the correlation analysis. The correlation coefficient between expressed acceptance of others and dogmatism was -0.554307 . There definitely was a negative relationship between the two. The result of squaring that coefficient suggests that approximately 30.7% of the variance in scores on one test can be accounted for by the linear relation with the scores on the other test.


The way in which this predicts that the level of expressed acceptance goes up as the level of dogmatism goes down (and vice versa) is illustrated in the graph and equation that are the result of a simple linear regression analysis. For this purpose acceptance of others was treated as an independent variable and dogmatism as a dependent variable. Table 5 pictures the result. (See following page)

As a comparison a correlation analysis was also run on dogmatism and the expressed acceptance of self and others. It also was significant in a negative degree with a coefficient of -0.714179 accounting for approximately 51% of the variance in one on the basis of the other. That relationship is even higher than the one between acceptance of others and dogmatism (51% compared to 30.7%). This would seem to indicate that acceptance of self is more directly related to dogmatism than is acceptance of others. But since the investigation of that question is outside the scope of this study that implication was not pursued.

⁵Barbara Marie Falk, "A Study of the Congruence of Perceptions Between Counselors and Clients in the High School Setting," Dissertation Abstracts International, XXXIII:10 (April 1973), 5491A.

Table 5

Linear Regression Analysis for Dogmatism
and Expressed Acceptance of Others



The significance of the correlation between expressed acceptance of others and dogmatism is good at the .05 confidence level (table value .514 at 13 degrees of freedom). That is not as high as it might be but certainly illustrates what was mentioned as a possibility above: that the sample seems to be quite trustworthy as a reflector of the larger group it represents.

SUMMARY

Ph.D. pastoral counseling students at the School of Theology at Claremont were mailed Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale Form E and Berger's

Expressed Acceptance of Self and Expressed Acceptance of Others scale.

The sample was analyzed as to the relationship between expressed acceptance of others and dogmatism. The null hypothesis was that there was no relationship between the two but the hypothesis was proved incorrect.

There was a negative relationship confirming Rokeach's and Rogers' theories that as the level of dogmatism increases the level of acceptance decreases and vice versa.

It must be remembered, however, that the correlation coefficient accounts for approximately 30.7% of that relationship. That means that nearly 70% of the variance in one is not related to the other. The magnitude here is nearly as low as that in Lee and Ehrlich's study (.51 for them and .55+ for this one) which led them to question the importance of these variables to the dogmatism theory.⁶

⁶Dorothy E. Lee and Howard J. Ehrlich, "Beliefs about Self and Others: A Test of the Dogmatism Theory," Psychological Reports, XXVIII:3 (June 1971), 921.

Chapter 6

CONCLUSION

The question under discussion has been, what is the relationship between dogmatism and unconditional acceptance of others? Most often they are assumed to be opposites both cognitively and functionally.

A distinction was made between dogma as firm convictions, confidence, and strong belief and dogmatism as closedmindedness and rejection. The potential advantages of maintaining dogma without losing unconditional acceptance were underscored, but a dilemma is faced when that attempt is made. Past studies end up choosing to allow dogma to overpower unconditional acceptance and become legalistic and rejecting or unconditional acceptance to destroy dogma and become indiscriminately open and valueless.

Paul Tillich combined strong convictions and open acceptance in the theoretical category of love. That solution was suggested as a possible solution to the dilemma. Love as openness in spite of differences preserves separateness, freedom, and uniqueness. It produces confidence and security. But it does not deny strong beliefs nor avoid confrontation of others with opposing views, attitudes, or behaviors. In fact it condemns those things that would destroy the unity between individuals. Love as judgment cries out against the distorted expressions of human goodness while love as openness accepts all unconditionally on the basis of that essential goodness. Love as the absolute establishes the distinction between those convictions that are only applicable to some and itself. Love as both acceptance and judgment protects individuals from sacrificing their freedom to authority figures

of cutting themselves off from the benefit of constructive confrontation by others. It also requires the response of faith that precludes any attempts to bring about unity with others by works or manipulation.

If we can say that condemnation is part of love (Tillich's terms) and that condemnation is based on firm convictions and strong beliefs or values (aspects of what is called dogma in this study), then dogma and acceptance are both part of love. When these ideas are combined in this way they indicate that on the cognitive level they compliment each other. Dogma can become the confidence of self-assurance rather than the rejection of that which is different. Dogma as confidence loses the need to defensively protect itself from that which is threatening. That kind of belief system would allow for a very caring, appreciative acceptance of others. Acceptance can still be given unconditionally because the foundation for it is not affected by dogma's evaluation nor can it be manipulated by either the self or others. The essence on which acceptance is based is impervious to the distortions of its expression.

Dogma needs to be kept in perspective with unconditional acceptance. Cognitively that is more realistically done than practically. On the functional level of attitudes and behavior human experience indicates that it is extremely difficult to keep dogma as assurance of conviction from becoming dogmatism as defensive rejection of those with opposing views. The contrasting results of the theoretical and empirical comparison in this study illustrate that. Rokeach points at this fact too when he says,

The reason Christ-like figures such as Gandhi and Schweitzer are idealized is that they have the capacity to love those who

disagree with them no less than those who agree with them, and to love all to a far greater extent than most men are capable of.¹

It is too easy for the "in spite of" aspect of love to engender feelings of inequality and destroy real acceptance. It is too difficult to distinguish between essence and expressions of essence when one is hurt, offended, sad, or angry. It is too easy to elevate one's own ideas and convictions to make them (or attempt to make them) applicable to everyone. And it comes too naturally to give in to the demands or expectations of those who are of importance and become one of the majority in a misguided attempt to gain the security of acceptance or avoid the anguish of rejection.

Yet, in spite of these difficulties, the task, though perplexing and improbable, is not impossible. For the Christian the challenge is particularly worthy, both because in the life and death of Christ is an example of success and because of His request that his followers emulate Him. In Him dogma was so strong as to condemn those for whom He was the Source of life. But unconditional acceptance of others was so strong that He took the condemnation in Himself and let it destroy Him. His drive toward unity was so intense that He chose to sacrifice Himself rather than accept estrangement. In that radical act he preserved the integrity of both unconditional acceptance and dogma and satisfied the demands of each.

But in order to combine both categories in our own experience, the emulation must be preceded by our acknowledging, accepting, and experiencing the meaning of His act. That demands that we accept our-

¹Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind (New York: Basic, 1960), p. 392.

selves as acceptable in spite of whatever evidence there may be to the contrary. It isn't to deny inadequacies and avoid condemnation, but to experience acceptance in spite of them. It is this faith, this confidence in the redeeming quality of the Christ event that provides the possibility of dogma and unconditional acceptance complimenting one another.

This position is not without hazards. By holding on to dogma there is the continual danger of it becoming distorted and leading to the excesses of dogmatism. And by maintaining the importance of human response there is the danger that that response will take the form of works instead of or without faith.

APPLICATIONS

This conclusion challenges Christians and particularly leaders in the Christian religion to educate others as to the real meaning of dogmatism and unconditional acceptance of others. Again Rokeach's comments are all too true. About dogmatism he says:

Christian tradition has two primary Biblical sources for its position on human values--the "thou shalt nots" of the 10 Commandments and the "thou shalts" of the Sermon on the Mount. The findings presented here suggest that the church has done a much better job of teaching us what not to do than what we ought to do.²

And about acceptance:

All organized Western religious groups teach their adherents, and those they try to convert, contradictory sets of beliefs. On the one hand, they teach mutual love and respect, the Golden Rule, the love of justice and mercy, and the equality of all men in the eyes of God. On the other hand, they teach (implicitly if not openly) that only certain people can be saved--those who believe as they

²Milton Rokeach, "Faith, Hope, and Bigotry," Psychology Today III:11 (April 1970), 58.

do; that only certain people are chosen people; that there is only one real truth--theirs.³

There is little doubt that we as Christian leaders have largely failed in that regard and must bring practice to our theory.

The conclusion also challenges counselors to distinguish between acceptance and dogmatism. It points out, contrary to Arbuckle's argument, that commitment to personal or denominational values need not disrupt acceptance of another.⁴ If the goal of counseling is to restore the power of choice rather than determine what choice will be made, openness is possible while personal values are held firm. It suggests, in fact, that without the presence of evaluation and condemnation there cannot be the restoration to basic goodness we seek.

Wilbert Wright is no doubt correct when he says that those who seek out pastoral counselors may be more responsive to a dogmatic approach to counseling.⁵ Scobie and others have emphasized that a certain amount of dogmatism is inherent in religion, so that is natural. And, to a point, Bernard Pacella is right when he suggests that value judgments are part of the role of a pastor and not to give them denies their pastoral function.⁶ But the thesis of this study would imply that all counselors--

³Milton Rokeach, Belief, Attitudes and Values (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1968), p. 189.

⁴Dugald Sinclair Arbuckle, Counseling: Philosophy, Theory and Practice (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1965), p. 17.

⁵Wilbert Wright, "Counselor Dogmatism, Willingness to Disclose and Clients' Empathy Ratings," Journal of Counseling Psychology, XXII:5 (September 1975), 390-394.

⁶Bernard L. Pacella, "A Critical Appraisal of Pastoral Counseling," American Journal of Psychiatry, CXXIII:6 (December 1966), 649.

and lay persons too--should have a deep enough concern for others to share their personal convictions with them--but still leave them free to make their own choices. Sharing values is not the unique domain of the pastor but part of all healthy human relationships.

The theory advocated here is based neither on humanity's total depravity nor its inevitable improvement. The one would suggest counseling methods that are so conservative as to rely only on the supernatural intervention of God. The other would be so humanistic as to rely solely on the works of human beings. Though either one may provide temporary solutions, only a combination of the two can achieve deep freedom from the causes and provide realistic hopes for future change.

Just as combining both supernatural and natural methods in a restoration process brings present healing and the potential of future growth, so combining dogmatism and unconditional acceptance of others brings that two-fold blessing. Unconditional acceptance provides a positive orientation to life where growth rather than sickness becomes the focus. And dogmatism provides the confrontation of reality that prevents the optimistic outlook from becoming idealistic and fantasy.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

Several issues not directly related to this investigation come to mind. What effect does this have on the concept of acceptance of self? If it is possible to be dogmatic yet accepting of others, does this mean that it would be possible to accept oneself even though one wasn't living up to personal standards? Wouldn't that produce inner conflict and incongruence? Or would it lead to disagreement with studies supporting a direct link between self and other acceptance? Or could it

be answered by accepting one's own limitations and the forgiveness of acceptance?

Rokeach discusses the matter of opinion and behavior change. Does this study relate to that in any way? Does the apparent Christian disparity between theory and practice carry over into their evangelistic methods and thus blunt their persuasiveness? Does it prevent them from effectively utilizing different approaches, from authoritarian to openminded, to different types of people? Might there be some implications here for church growth methodology?

We have studied here individuals' expressed attitudes toward others and had them evaluate their own dogmatism level. Would the results be any different if others who knew them evaluated them for those traits?

What methods might best be used to communicate the distinction between dogma as condemnation of externals and acceptance as affirmation of essence? In what experiential ways is that message perceived? How might that be best taught? Learned?

Would the results of this empirical test be different if it were administered to different types of groups: lay Christians, non-Christians, non-religious persons?

What would the results of a behavioral study of this relationship show? Would they be consistent with the findings of this attitude survey? More pronounced? Less?

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adorno, T., E. Irenkel-Brunswick, D. Levison and R. N. Sanford. The Authoritarian Personality. New York: Harper & Row, 1950.
- Arbuckle, Dugald Sinclair. Counseling: Philosophy, Theory and Practice. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1965.
- Arthur, Lindsay G. "Should Children Be as Equal as People?" in Albert E. Wilkerson (ed.) The Rights of Children. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1973.
- Ashbrook, James B. "Paul Tillich Converses with Psychotherapists." Journal of Religion and Health, XI (January 1972), 40-72.
- Assagioli, Roberto. The Act of Will. New York: Viking Press, 1973.
- _____. Psychosynthesis: A Manual of Principles and Techniques. New York: Viking Press, 1965.
- Baute, Paschal. "The Place of Counseling in the Church: The Work of the Pastoral Counselor." Religious Education, LXI:2 (March-April 1966), 120-128.
- Berger, Emanuel M. "The Relation Between Expressed Acceptance of Self and Expressed Acceptance of Others." Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, XLVII:4 (October 1952), 778-782.
- Cartwright, Dorwin, and Alvin F. Zander (eds.) Group Dynamics, Research and Theory. 2d ed. New York: Harper & Row, 1960.
- Chamberlain, Lewis. "Martin Luther." Christianity Today, XIV:15 (April 24, 1970), 4.
- Clinebell, Howard J., Jr. Basic Types of Pastoral Counseling. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1961.
- _____. Growth Counseling for Marriage Enrichment. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975.
- _____ and Charlotte H. Clinebell. The Intimate Marriage. New York: Harper & Row, 1970.
- _____ and Frank W. Kimper. "The Theological Foundations of Personal Growth Groups." Claremont: School of Theology at Claremont, [n.d.] (Mimeographed.)
- Cobb, John B., Jr. "A Process Systematic Theology." Journal of Religion, L:2 (April 1970), 199-206.
- Collins, Doris Louise. "Empathic Ability and Dogmatism in Nursing Students." Dissertation Abstracts International, XXXIII:6 (December 1972), 2609A.

- Cook, James Montague. Grace and Dogmatism in the Theology of Nels F. S. Ferré. Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1975.
- Cottle, Thomas J. "Parent and Child--the Hazards of Equality," in David Gottlieb (ed.) Children's Liberation. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1973.
- Coulson, William R., and Carl R. Rogers (eds.) Man and the Science of Man. Columbus: Merrill, 1968.
- Cousins, Ewert. "A Theology of Interpersonal Relations," Thought, XLV:176 (Spring 1970), 56-82.
- Digenan, Sister Mary Anne. "The Relationship of Religious Orientation, Prejudice, and Dogmatism in Three Groups of Christian College Students." Dissertation Abstracts International, XXXIII:6 (December 1972), 2789B-2790B.
- Di Guiseppe, Raymond A. "Dogmatism Correlation with Strength of Religious Conviction." Psychological Reports, XXVIII:1 (February 1971), 64.
- Evans, Richard I. Carl Rogers: The Man and His Ideas. New York: Dutton, 1975.
- Falk, Barbara Marie. "A Study of the Congruence of Perceptions Between Counselors and Clients in the High School Setting." Dissertation Abstracts International, XXXIII:10 (April 1973), 5491A.
- Farson, Richard. Birthrights. New York: Macmillan, 1974.
- Finnigan, Daniel William. "Relationship of Openmindedness/Closedmindedness to Certain Personality Characteristics Involving Self-Regard." Dissertation Abstracts International, XXXII:4 (October 1971), 2376B.
- Foulds, Melvin L. "Dogmatism and the Ability to Communicate Facilitative Conditions During Counseling." Counselor Education and Supervision, XI:2 (December 1971), 110-114.
- Frick, Willard B. Humanistic Psychology: Interviews with Maslow, Murphy, and Rogers. Columbus: Merrill, 1971.
- Fromm, Erich. Man for Himself. New York: Rinehart, 1947.
- _____. Psychoanalysis and Religion. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950.
- Gilmore, Susan K. "Personality Differences Between High and Low Dogmatism Groups of Pentecostal Believers." Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, VIII:1 (Spring 1969), 161-164.
- Gilson, Etienne. Dogmatism and Tolerance. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1952.

- Goldstein, Joseph, Anna Freud and Albert J. Solnit. Beyond the Best Interests of the Child. New York: Free Press, 1973.
- Gonzalez-Tamayo, Eulogy. "Dogmatism, Self-Acceptance and Acceptance of Others among Spanish and American Students." Journal of Social Psychology, XCIV (1971), 15-25.
- Greene, Ronald. "Self-Disclosure, Dogmatism, and Sensory Acuity as They Relate to Humanistic Concepts of Mental Health." Dissertation Abstracts International, XXXII:11 (May 1972), 6647B.
- Grounds, Vernon C. "Therapist and Theologian Look at Love." Christianity Today, XV:22 (August 6, 1971), 14-16.
- Hamilton, Kenneth. The System and the Gospel. New York: Macmillan, 1963.
- Hammond, Guyton B. Man in Estrangement: A Comparison of the Thought of Paul Tillich and Erich Fromm. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1965.
- _____. The Power of Self-Transcendence: An Introduction to the Philosophical Theology of Paul Tillich. St. Louis: Bethany Press, 1966.
- Hellstedt, Jon Craig. "Dogmatism and the Mental Health Activities of Lutheran Clergymen." Dissertation Abstracts, XXXII:4 (October 1971), 2177A.
- Kegley, Charles W. and Robert W. Bretall (eds.) The Theology of Paul Tillich. New York: Macmillan, 1952.
- Kemp, C. Gratton. "Influence of Dogmatism on the Training of Counselors." Journal of Counseling Psychology, IX:2 (1962), 155-157.
- Kimper, Frank W. "Gleanings from Gestalt Therapy." Claremont: School of Theology at Claremont, [n.d.]. (Mimeographed.)
- _____. Lecture. Claremont, October 3, 1973.
- _____. "Love and Anger." Claremont: School of Theology at Claremont, [n.d.]. (Mimeographed.)
- _____. "A Meditation." Claremont: School of Theology at Claremont, [n.d.]. (Mimeographed.)
- Kittel, Gerhard "δοκέω" in his Theological Dictionary of the New Testament. 10 vols. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964, II, 232-255.
- Koch, Sigmund (ed.) Psychology: A Study of a Science. 3 vols. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959.

- Kolb, David A., Irwin M. Rubin, and James M. McIntyre (eds.) Organizational Psychology: a Book of Readings, 2d ed. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1974.
- Lee, Dorothy Eleanor. "Beliefs About Self and Others: A Test of the Dogmatism Theory." Dissertation Abstracts, XXXI:9 (March 1971), 4887A.
- _____ and Howard J. Ehrlich. "Beliefs about Self and Others: A Test of the Dogmatism Theory." Psychological Reports, XXVIII:3 (June 1971), 919-922.
- Long, Barbara H. "Catholic-Protestant Differences in Acceptance of Others." Sociology and Social Science Research, XLIX:2 (1965), 166-172.
- Madden, Myron C. The Power to Bless. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1970.
- May, Rollo. Love and Will. New York: Norton, 1969.
- _____. "Love, Jealousy and Power." McCalls, C:2 (November 1972), 83, 122, 124, 126.
- Neill, A. S. and others. Children's Rights. New York: Praeger, 1971.
- Nelson, John Wiley. "An Inquiry into the Methodological Structure of Paul Tillich's 'Systematic Theology'." Encounter, XXV (Summer 1974), 171-183.
- Oden, Thomas C. "Who Says You're OK?" Faith/At/Work, LXXXVII:5 (August 1974), 8-10.
- Pacella, Bernard L. "A Critical Appraisal of Pastoral Counseling." The American Journal of Psychiatry, CXXIII:6 (December 1966), 646-651.
- Passons, W. R. "The Relationship of Counselor Characteristics and Empathic Sensitivity." Dissertation Abstracts, XXIX (1968), 2968A.
- Perls, Frederick S. Gestalt Therapy Verbatim, ed. John O. Stevens. Moab, UT: Real People Press, 1969.
- Petty, Joseph Gary. "Predicting Counselor Trainee Success." Dissertation Abstracts, XXXI:7 (January 1971), 4317B-4318B.
- Polster, Ervin, and Miriam Polster. Gestalt Therapy Integrated. New York: Brunner/Mazel, 1973.
- Rand, Ayn. The Virtue of Selfishness: A New Concept of Egoism. New York: New American Library, 1964.
- Rogers, Carl R. Becoming Partners: Marriage and Its Alternatives. New York: Delacorte Press, 1972.

- _____. Client-Centered Therapy: Its Current Practice, Implications, and Theory. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1951.
- _____. The Clinical Treatment of the Problem Child. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1939.
- _____. Counseling and Psychotherapy: Newer Concepts in Practice. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1942.
- _____. Counseling with Returned Servicemen. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1946.
- _____. "Freedom and Commitment." Humanist, XXIV:2 (March-April 1964), 37-40.
- _____. Freedom to Learn: A View of What Education Might Become. Columbus: Merrill, 1969.
- _____. On Becoming a Person: A Therapist's View of Psychotherapy. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961.
- _____. On Encounter Groups. New York: Harper & Row, 1970.
- _____. On Personal Power. New York: Delacorte Press, 1977.
- _____ and Barry Stevens. Person to Person: The Problem of Being Human; A New Trend in Psychology. Lafayette, CA: Real People Press, 1967.
- _____ and G. Marian Kinget. Psychoterapie et Relations Humaines: Theorie et Pratique de la Therapie Non-Directive. 2 vols. 2d ed. revisée et corectée. Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1965.
- _____ and Rosalind F. Dymond (eds.) Psychotherapy and Personality Change; Co-ordinated Research Studies in the Client-Centered Approach. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954.
- _____ (ed.) The Therapeutic Relationship and Its Impact: A Study of Psychotherapy with Schizophrenics. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967.
- _____. A Therapist's View of Personal Goals. Wallingford, PA: Pendle Hill, 1962.
- Rokeach, Milton. Beliefs, Attitudes and Values; A Theory of Organization and Change. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1968.
- _____. "Commentary on the Commentaries." Review of Religious Research, XI:2 (Winter 1970), 155-162.
- _____. "Faith, Hope, and Bigotry." Psychology Today, III:11 (April 1970), 33-37, 58.

- _____. "Generalized Mental Rigidity as a Factor in Ethnocentrism." Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, XLIII (July 1948), 259-278.
- _____. "Narrow-mindedness and Personality." Journal of Personality, XX (1951), 234-251.
- _____. The Nature of Human Values. New York: Free Press, 1973.
- _____. The Open and Closed Mind: Investigations into the Nature of Belief Systems and Personality Systems. New York: Basic, 1960.
- _____. "Political and Religious Dogmatism: An Alternative to the Authoritarian Personality." Psychological Monographs, LXX (1956).
- _____. "Religious Values and Social Compassion." Review of Religious Research, XI:1 (Fall 1969), 24-38.
- _____. The Three Christs of Ypsilanti; a Psychological Study. New York: Knopf, 1964.
- _____. "Value Systems in Religion." Review of Religious Research, XI:1 (Fall 1969) 3-23.
- Scobie, Geoffrey E. W. Psychology of Religion. New York: Wiley, 1975.
- Sheikh, Anees S., and L. Martin Moleski. "Dogmatism and Mental Health: A Study of Perceived Relationship." Perceptual and Motor Skills, LXI:1 (August 1975), 290.
- Sherr, Rose Lynn. "Dogmatism as a Factor in Preprofessionals' Evaluations of Persons with Physical Disabilities." Dissertation Abstracts International, XXXI:11 (May 1971), 6164A.
- Sobosan, Jeffrey G. "Suffering, Innocence and Love." Christian Century, LCI:14 (April 10, 1974), 397-398.
- Steininger, Marion P., Barbara E. Durso, and Carolyn Pasquariello. "Dogmatism and Attitudes." Psychological Reports, XXX:1 (February 1972), 151-157.
- Tavard, George H. Paul Tillich and the Christian Message. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1962.
- Thornton, Edward E. Theology and Pastoral Counseling. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964.
- Tillich, Paul. "Being and Love," in Four Existential Theologians. Introduction and biographical notes by Will Herberg. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1958.
- _____. Biblical Religion and the Search for the Ultimate Reality. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955.

- _____. Dynamics of Faith. New York: Harper & Row, 1957.
- _____. A History of Christian Thought From Its Judaic and Hellenistic Origins to Existentialism, ed. Carl E. Braaten. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968.
- _____. Love, Power and Justice: Ontological Analyses and Ethical Applications. London: Oxford University Press, 1954.
- _____ and Carl Rogers. Paul Tillich and Carl Rogers: a Dialogue. San Diego: San Diego State College, 1966.
- _____. Systematic Theology. 3 vols. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951-1963.
- _____. "Reply," in Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall (eds.) The Theology of Paul Tillich. New York: Macmillan, 1952.
- Tosi, Donald J. "Dogmatism within the Counselor-Client Dyad." Journal of Counseling Psychology, XVII:3 (May 1970), 284-288.
- Treat, Robert Straight. A Validation Study of Rokeach's Theory of Dogmatism. Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Claremont Graduate School, 1963.
- Vande Loo, Ronald John. "A Social Character Analysis of Individuals Scoring Open-minded on the Dogmatism Scale." Dissertation Abstracts International, XXXV:12 (June 1975), 6120B-6121B.
- Weller, Leonard, and others. "Religiosity and Authoritarianism." Journal of Social Psychology, XCV:1 (February 1975), 11-18.
- Williams, David L., and Bruce J. Kremer. "Pastoral Counseling Students and Secular Counseling Students: A Comparison." Journal of Counseling Psychology, XXI:3 (May 1974), 238-242.
- Wright, Wilbert. "Counselor Dogmatism, Willingness to Disclose and Clients' Empathy Ratings." Journal of Counseling Psychology, XXII:5 (September 1975), 390-394.
- "Yes Begins with a No." Time, XCV (June 22, 1970), 66, 69-70.